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1

INTRODUCTION

This paper sets out to critique the current discourse on human agency and the implications of
it when conceiving of ethics and human action. More specifically, I use Saba Mahmood’s
project on agency for its discussion of specific religious ritual to expose what it can teach us
about the topic of agency and how we think about it, talk about it (the language we use), and the
ethical and political implications that may stem from our views on agency. I argue that Mahmood’s approach is a useful alternative to the typical manner in which discourse on agency takes
place. I support this claim by using CLR James’ book Beyond a Boundary to show how Mahmood’s approach can be used to interpret certain human actions like those James’ book. More
importantly, I show that Mahmood’s approach provides a richer and more complex understanding of these actions than the common approach of the discourse. As a result, my project elaborates and complicates one typical description of religious ritual (the liberal feminist approach as
described by Mahmood) by seeing how her approach works in circumstances like those in CLR
James’ book about cricket in colonial Trinidad, its players, and its influence on James’ life as a
whole.
The implications of this project aim to contribute to not only liberal feminist discourse on
agency (as put forward by Mahmood), but also to show how Mahmood’s observations and assertions are relevant to other topics and areas of human actions such as sport. I will explicitly discuss these implications more in the conclusion and bring in relevant discussions of what this
means in discussing virtue, ethics, and what it means to act “politically”.
I use Saba Mahmood’s anthropological work on the women’s mosque movement in Cairo,
Egypt to enter into this discussion and use her assertions on this topic as the foundation for my
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project. I specifically use her book Politics of Piety to aid in my discussion of these categories.
In this project, she describes the religious rituals of women participating in the mosque movement. Based on those interactions and descriptions of the ritual, she argues that the secular liberal approach to conceiving of agency misunderstands what is really at work in the ritual actions of
these women. Along with this, she exposes the assumptions upon which this secular liberal
foundation lies and, in turn, provides ground for questioning the prescriptions that rely on such
assumptions and offers suggestions for how this discussion may and should take place. I use
Mahmood’s suggestions in her and apply them to parts of CLR James’ book Beyond a Boundary
in order to demonstrate the usefulness of the approach to agency she develops. In turn, my work
with James demonstrates how Mahmood’s main points are relevant outside of religious contexts
and therefore have larger implications for general human action.
I begin by laying the foundation of both Mahmood’s and James’ books for the rest of the discussion. I then explain how the typical or dominant approach to agency seemingly misses key
aspects of, or at least useful aspects of, human action. The primary reason it misses these aspects
stems from conceiving of agency solely in terms of resistance or acceptance of social norms.
Mahmood builds this critique which I add to and support by using examples from James’ book.
Then, using some of Mahmood’s suggestions along with my own, I move into a discussion of
what a conception of agency should look like and account for. Then I point to the implications
that this “new” conception of agency has for discourse on ethics and consider what it means to
act “politically” in society.
Mahmood’s Politics of Piety begins by critiquing the typical liberal feminist approach to
studying or conceiving of agency.1 She claims that the liberal feminist conception of agency

1

Mahmood, Saba (2005). Politics of Piety: the Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
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classifies an act as an act of freedom or agency if it resists a social norm or prescription. This
limits the study of action to only recognizing those human actions that either resist or accept social norms. Furthermore, the implications of such a conception carry over to ethical and political
prescriptions and therefore need to be reconsidered.
The liberal feminist approach, as critiqued by Mahmood, leaves little room for conceiving of
actions that accept social practices or norms in any other way than viewing the actor as a socialized or oppressed actor of society. Mahmood claims that this binary categorization of action
misses key aspects of human action that do not necessarily fall neatly into this liberal framework.
In other words, these liberal conceptions of ritual unduly categorize the ritual of Muslim women
in Egypt as representative of the extent by which women are dominated in a patriarchal and masculine society. For Mahmood, this conception of ritual overlooks or fails to leave room for the
way in which these women perform ritual with personal motivations, efforts, and tendencies that
tell a deeper story than typical liberal approaches would tell.2 In addition, it overlooks their performance of these rituals as lacking ethical or political meaning in society which Mahmood
shows as mistaken.
Throughout my project I reference this “secular liberal” approach and want to spend some
time clarifying why I refer to it as such and what specifically is at stake when discussing it.
Generally, with “liberalism” I’m referring to the current dominant discourse when it comes to
academia. Liberalism and the assumptions that come along with it tread deeper than one should
be comfortable with. It seems that the very spirit of academia should be to expose, question, and
2

The critique against Mahmood here is that by employing such value in ritual, she fails to escape the very discourse
she is criticizing. The fact that a ritual needs to account for something, or arguing that it is meaningful (just in a
different way), still subscribes to the same liberal value system and, in turn, its potential oppressive repercussions.
Regardless, I value Mahmood’s critique that liberal discourse tend toward approaching social practices in a certain
way that doesn’t tell the whole story. Whether it is possible to tell the whole story is irrelevant and the holes in each
approach/theory need to be pointed out and filled. Mahmood provides a useful start to doing this and that is what I
use her approach for.
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prevent the development of universal assumptions. Mahmood specifies some of the liberal assumptions we should be uncomfortable with: the belief that all humans have an innate desire for
freedom, that all humans seek to or do assert their autonomy when provided the opportunity, and
that human agency primarily consists of acts that challenge social norms rather than those that
may challenge them (Mahmood 5). I expand more on why these are false assumptions below.
Specifically, “secular” liberalism adds its own set of assumptions to the discourse. Mahmood’s project connects the authority of a particular discourse to its “model of sociability” or the
actions it prescribes for its subjects. For example, a secular theory or discourse may use nationalist or other political theories to inform its model of sociability while a religious one will look
to religious ethics and values to inform these models of sociability. By “model of sociability”
Mahmood is generally referring to how a particular discourse prescribes its subjects to carry
themselves and to act both privately and publicly (Mahmood 73). Understanding the thrust of
these models of sociability remains important for connecting the actions discussed by both
Mahmood (religious rituals) and myself (examples from James’ book) to ethics and politics.
Mahmood writes:
As theorists of the public sphere have come to recognize, regulation of such quotidian practices is of eminent
political concern because they play a crucial role in shaping the civic and public sensibilities essential to the
consolidation of a secular-liberal polity. The elaboration of the secular-liberal project in the Middle East has
entailed a profound alteration in, and reorganization of, people’s ethical and aesthetic sensibilities, life choices,
and manner of public and personal conduct- not to mention a complete transformation of legal, educational, and
political institutions. (Mahmood 73-74)

The secular liberal discourse does not merely affect public life, then, it also requires changes in
thought and approach to personal aspects of one’s life. While this may not be an explicit aim of
the secular-liberal approach, it is an inevitable result as Mahmood exposes in her project and description of the experience of the mosque movement participants.

5

Mahmood specifically frames her work to speak to liberal feminists while I use her approach
to speak to secular liberalism more generally. By “secular-liberal” approach, I mean the popular
philosophical tradition which assumes that all people have innate desires for freedom and independence. Furthermore, this “secular” discourse divides human social life (or maintains that it
should be divided) into separate secular and religious categories. Secular and religious practices
are treated separately and given specific arenas for which they are respectively appropriate. I,
like Mahmood, speak about these traditions generally rather than engaging too much with particular aspects of it. Although these philosophical traditions have different strands and contentions,
they are generally founded upon a familiar and consistent principle. For the feminist liberals that
Mahmood discusses she writes: “Despite the many strands and differences within feminism,
what accords the feminist tradition an analytical and political coherence is the premise that where
society is structured to serve male interests, the result will be either neglect, or direct suppression, of women’s concerns” (Mahmood 10).3 This is the feminist assumption that Mahmood engages with. Similarly, my project and her project both engage with the liberal assumption that
all human beings have an innate desire for freedom. The problem with such an assumption is
when human action that asserts this freedom by resisting particular norms or virtues is favored in
discourse.
Before digging into the main theoretical issues at hand, I want to give a brief introduction into Mahmood’s project on the women’s mosque movement in Cairo. Mahmood uses the women’s mosque movement to discuss issues of agency and politics because of the “challenges” it
poses to the liberal approach. The mosque movement is part of the larger Islamic revival movement in Egypt. The Islamic revival movement, especially after September 11, 2001 was never

3

In her footnote to this passage she points the reader to Hartsock 1983, MacKinnon 1989, and Collier and Yanagisako 1989.
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popular with liberals because of its rejection of ”liberal values” and lack of concern with women’s freedom (Mahmood 1). Under the liberal conception of agency, women’s participation in
the Islamist movement is characterized as representative of women being un-awakened to their
true desire to be freed from what is perceived to be an oppressive system.
Mahmood wants to challenge the inclination of liberal feminists to characterize participation
in such a movement as opposing their true will or desires. It seems evident that the liberal conception lacks the ability to account for what’s really going on in this movement if “modern”
women continue to participate in it and the “modern” world. Mahmood maintains that oversight
should be enough to motivate liberal feminists to reconceive of agency and political action,
hence her critique in this work. She exposes the fact that liberal conceptions of self, moral agency and politics leave little room for conceiving of these women’s actions in any way other than
as oppressed or un-enlightened. After exposing this, Mahmood wants to examine and show what
forms of agency are really at work in the actions of these women since it does not seem to be the
case that they are unenlightened and oppressed individuals.
The Islamic Revival movement refers to the efforts behind an increased religious sensibility
in Muslim societies represented by mosques and other public displays of religiosity such as the
wearing of the veil by women and religious public literature (Mahmood 3). The women’s mosque movement, specifically, offers religious lessons for women.
The women that Mahmood worked with aim to live the value of piety in every aspect of
their lives: “The women I worked with described the condition of piety as the quality of “being
close to God”: a manner of being and acting that suffuses all of one’s acts, both religious and
worldly in character…The attitude with which these acts are performed is as important as their
prescribed form; sincerity, humility, and feelings of virtuous fear and awe are all emotions by
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which excellence and virtuosity in piety are measured and marked” (Mahmood 123). This connection between acts and the “manner of being” accompanying them is an important aspect of
my project. The act itself is not the key, but considering how it is done and with what emotions
are key aspects to consider that liberal feminist approach overlooks.
Mahmood began her work in 1995, a time when these religious lessons for women were
prevalent in most neighborhoods. Mahmood writes: “According to the participants, the mosque
movement had emerged in response to the perception that religious knowledge, as a means of
organizing daily conduct had become increasingly marginalized under modern structures of secular governance” (Mahmood 4). The aim of the mosque movement is to avoid or prevent further secularization of society as it faces increased pressure to do so from secular liberal society.
Although the women’s mosque movement focuses on piety, the movement does not suggest
that its participants withdraw from participating in society. Rather, the movement encourages
and calls for transforming all aspects of one’s life especially in the social and public sphere
(think of the “models of sociability” mentioned above). Mahmood highlights the transformations the women of the mosque movement have in fact made in the public sphere, especially in
terms of styles of dress, appropriateness of media and entertainment, household dynamics, and
terms or styles of public debate (Mahmood 4). Indeed the movement is a public one, but Mahmood’s focus lies even deeper. She uses this movement to expose and complicate normative liberal assumptions like the belief that all humans have an innate desire for freedom, that all humans seek to or do assert their autonomy when provided the opportunity, and that human agency
primarily consists of acts that challenge social norms rather than those that may challenge them
(Mahmood 5).
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Mahmood, more broadly, is making suggestions about the way that academic discourse as a
whole takes place and seems to be predicated on these secular liberal assumptions and the categories that uphold them. By exposing these assumptions in this particular study, one can see
parallels and overlays with other disciplines and stories such as I do with James’ work.
In his book Beyond a Boundary, CLR James tells a story in which cricket and colonialism in
West Trinidad play out. Although it may appear as an autobiography, James is clear that it is
actually an “autobiographical framework” he employs in order to account for the way in which
factual events interacted with the development of ideas in a sequential order. It is especially important to note that James largely wrote explicitly political literature as a known socialist but I
chose to use his autobiography for the project at hand. I use Beyond a Boundary because it is
useful in showing how a simple everyday life may turn into an explicitly “political” endeavor.
I use James’ illustration of particular cricket players, their habits, and the connection he sees
of them to his deeper thoughts and feelings. My discussion of James’ book demonstrates first,
that the secular liberal approach to agency does not attribute agency to the meaningful aspects of
the events or people described by James. Second, that Mahmood’s suggested approach to agency maps on onto the events and people in James’ story more satisfactorily.
One of the most telling parts of the book that my reader should be mindful of is when James
describes one of two trademarks to his life.4 In this part, James notes that it is interesting the
way in which not only a particular person, but a stroke of a bat can heavily mark one’s life.5

4

I spend a good deal of time here with direct quotations but I feel that it is the words of James’ description early on
in the book that speak most clearly to my point. It is in these pages and James’ words that the reader experiences
how moving cricket, even one play of cricket, was for James at a young age. Yes, James is describing how he felt as
a spectator but it is these moments that moved him to play and what the motivations of his expectations for cricket
were.
5
I will discuss that this is especially significant because generally speaking, people think of people or events as influential or marking their lives. While a batter’s swing may be conceived of in certain term as an event this is usually only thought of as a part to a larger event (a particular play in a world series game, etc), James is special (like
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While secular liberal theorists may attribute this influence to social factors, I argue that James’
personal description of this batter’s stroke and how/why it came to be especially meaningful
shows that these theorists do not account for all that is present in James’ experience, or more
simply that they account for the less meaningful aspects (in terms of what constitutes agency) of
the action than Mahmood’s conception of agency.
Growing up, James’ house backed up to a cricket field so he was able to watch cricket
matches whenever he felt inclined. The stroke that he discusses is made by a Trinidadian man
named Arthur Jones. James writes:
I have watched county cricket for weeks on end and seen whole Test matches without seeing one cut such as
Jones used to make, and for years whenever I saw one I murmured to myself, ‘Arthur Jones!’ The crowd was
waiting for it, I at my window was waiting, and as soon as I began to play seriously I learnt that Arthur was
waiting for it too. When the ball hit down outside the off-stump (and now, I think, even when it was straight)
Jones lifted himself to his height, up went his bat and he brought it down across the ball as a woodsman puts his
axe to tree. (James 5)

This description of a play is more detailed than a mere re-telling of what happened: it actually
provides insight about what made a swing more meaningful than the result, which is merely
noted rather than the center of the account. The swing is described in detail because the detail of
it is itself telling/special. At the time James experienced this swing, he was unsure of why it was
so exciting for him. Mahmood points out similarly that for the women of the mosque movement,
the importance of the ritual does not lie in whether or not they performed the ritual, but how they
performed the ritual and what was put into it.
Later, in school as a teen, James came across a passage about a cricketer (Beldham) that
helped him understand why this experience with Jones’ swing was so exciting. Here is the passage:
It was a study for Phidias to see Beldham rise to strike; the grandeur of the attitude, the settled composure
of the look, the piercing lightning of the eye, the rapid glances of the bat, were electrical. Men’s hearts
Mahmood) for finding the play itself meaningful despite the larger field (the swing was not moving because it won
the world series, Jones may have even gotten ‘out’ on this swing but it was, or, is beautiful regardless.
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throbbed within them, their cheeks turned pale and red. Michael Angelo should have painted him. (James
5)

For James, this passage helped capture what was going on when he experienced Arthur Jones’
cut. The batter’s physical positioning, attitude, and power all combined with perfect timing stimulated this moment and the feelings it evoked in the spectators6.
For James, his experience of Jones’ cut was purely enjoyable in and for itself (he mentions that literature was the same way, while it started as a chore it became enjoyable in itself).
In general, James’ work demonstrates what can be missed by looking at such an instance and
merely accounting for the “end” or result of the play (as many discussions of sport often do).
For James, Jones was, fundamentally, a natural and beautiful cutter. James does not give the
reader any external story or reasoning behind his valuing of Jones’ cut, other than the way it was
executed and the way it made him feel. I maintain that this contrasts the way in which a secular
liberal approach would account for Jones’ swing or James’ appreciation of it. In my next section, I give a detailed account of the binary that the secular liberal approach functions with: that
of resistance or acceptance of a social norm. As a result, what becomes important is not necessarily how one participates in an action but rather if one participates in the particular action or
not.
I use James’ book Beyond a Boundary as a tool to digest Mahmood’s work but also to
bring her work to life outside explicitly religious contexts. I do this because it seems to be at the
very heart of what she is pushing scholars to do. By applying her approach or view of certain
religious rituals and what they mean for agency to seemingly non-religious human actions such

6

I may face some resistance when making parallels of this to Mahmood’s study because this example discusses the
person performing the action and its influence on others whereas Mahmood’s seems strictly personal with the practitioners of the mosque movement But, I am pointing to something larger in James’ book. This part is his first point
being moved by cricket that motivates him to practice cricket and experience all that it invokes to his life politically.
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as cricket, I am thereby assisting in her project to help blur the sometimes impenetrable categories of liberal discourse and its assumptions. James’ book is especially useful because of his
writing style, his story, and the context in which the story takes place.
James’ book utilizes what he terms an “autobiographical framework” and begins by recounting his encounters with cricket and its local “characters” in the town of Trinidad he grew up
in. James gives the reader detail about his experience with growing up close to the sport of
cricket during colonial times when dark skinned Trinidadian players did not have the same options or opportunities as whites. In addition, James gives the reader insight into his experience
going to school in Trinidad and the accompanying tensions of being a native Trinidadian at a colonial school trying to uphold expectations of breaking the boundaries set by racism in Trinidad
at this time. James parallels this experience by describing some of the great cricket players he
encountered. I use these parts of the book to demonstrate the connections James draws between
the players both on and off the field. Finally, I use James’ description of his time in England
writing and developing his nationalist tendencies for Trinidad.
The specific aspects of James I use are his descriptive approach of his experiences as a
child. In the following section I spend time explaining what I mean by his ambivalence toward
certain actors or experiences in his life. My point in using these examples is relatively simple: to
show that sometimes events in one’s life need not have a larger or deeper meaning thrust upon
them. Human action and experience can, as James point to, can be influential because of the person it partakes upon. This is not to say that the society and its institutions had nothing to do with
making these events meaningful, but rather, this is not where the focus should be (as liberal discourse typically recommends).

12

In the second section I use James’ description of cricket players to demonstrate that a
great cricket player, as seen by viewers of the game or play, is not simply embodying a physical
script predetermined by a coach or some other source. Rather, to get to the point of being a great
player or making great plays requires training of both one’s physical and mental “game”. I relate
this to Mahmood’s observations of ritual in the mosque movement participants and their call to
make certain rituals their own and manifest in their everyday demeanor, volitions, etc.
Although Mahmood is an anthropologist and James’s Beyond a Boundary, on the surface,
is meant to be a book on cricket, my project has direct implications for religious studies generally and the study of ritual more specifically. The suggestions made about liberal discourse in this
project parallel a similar discussion taking place in ritual studies, led by Catherine Bell in Ritual
Theory, Ritual Practice. Bell’s work, similar in nature to Mahmood’s project, leads a critical
analysis of the way ritual is studied and the sense in which it is used. She not only reveals the
problems with the way ritual is typically discussed, but points to an approach for studying ritual
that is “more disclosing of the strategies by which ritualized activities do what they do” (Bell 4).
My project speaks directly to Bell’s in the sense that I am more interested in the actual work the
actions at hand do rather than what they may or may not represent according to certain discourses or traditions (like secular liberalism). In turn, all three projects (Mahmood, Bell, and
mine) are revealing something about secular liberal discourse on the relevant topics at hand.7

7

Mahmood references Bell’s same work for its discussion of the common distinction made between symbolic and
instrumental practices, particularly when it comes to looking at what may be conceived as actions of “resistance”.
Like Mahmood, Bell exposes what is problematic about this approach. My project, in discussing actions in James
that wouldn’t typically be considered “religious” helps put the arguments made by Bell into practice. I do not expand on Bell’s theoretical project in mine because I feel that it is more practical to actually put it to practice and
point to it, rather than talk about it. After all, isn’t this exactly in the spirit of her project? (I focus on what the
project does rather than what it represents).
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2

A Critique of Conceiving of Agency Solely in terms of Resistance

In this section I form my main criticism of the way agency is typically treated in liberal
discourse: agency should not solely be recognized in terms of freedom/resistance or acceptance
of social norms. Liberal feminist discourses that only recognize actions of resistance as demonstrative of agency (and those of acceptance as lacking agency) miss the “big picture” or main
point and fail to account for actions that are not necessarily “resistant” to society. Further, those
actions that they do attribute agency to are for the wrong reasons. In this section, I’m interested
in discussing Mahmood’s claim that agency is not limited or necessarily characterized by resistance and will use examples from James’ book to support her assertions. The next section I expand on what, then, can and does constitute agency.
I argue that a responsible characterization and approach to agency in academic discourse
should account for various forms of agency characterized by different motivations (whether
physical, emotional, rational, etc.) stemming from a variety of traditions, cultures, and contexts.
The failure to account for these various forms of agency leads to misplaced judgments and prescriptions (a connection made explicit by Mahmood). Moreover, an academic cannot claim to be
locating and studying agency if the different modes from which agency is possible are not understood or accounted for.
I use Mahmood’s criticism of the liberal feminist approach to agency to help articulate
why the “resistance/acceptance” approach to agency is problematic. Her main criticism of typical liberal discourse is that the liberal concept of agency fails to account for those actions that
women who participate in the mosque movement in Cairo partake in. More specifically, liberal
feminist discourses assume that educated or “freed” women would resist typical Muslim practices like veiling and, given the option, would oppose the patriarchal structure of Islam. However,
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the women’s mosque movement in Cairo is an example of the exact opposite. Women of the
mosque movement are actively reviving the traditional practices of their religion.
Mahmood’s project aims to show how or why what these women’s actions are not merely
a sign of the women being heavily indoctrinated by an outmoded structure of society, but that the
practices of these women are demonstrative of a form of agency that is not accounted for (or at
least mischaracterized) by liberal feminist discourse. Mahmood illuminates the shortcomings of
this liberal feminist approach and therefore challenges the liberal view of what makes a particular life fulfilling and also challenges the liberal concept of what constitutes agency.
I generally agree with Mahmood’s critique of secular liberal discourse and its tendency to
favor particular actions that seem to represent resistance to dominant social norms. I argue that
discussions of agency should account for the variety of ways in which humans perform certain
actions. Secular liberal discourse came to favor acts of resistance because of liberalism’s normative aims and assumptions. However, secular liberal discourse is merely one discourse and
should not be the sole facilitator on deciding which acts constitute forms of agency and those that
do not. Actions like those of the women of the mosque movement and those in James are good
examples of why, as I explain below.
Upon first reading Mahmood, I was skeptical that Mahmood could “liberate” the term
“agency” from its deep secular liberal implications. The term “agency” itself seems to have
some fundamental connection to these normative concerns of secular liberalism (that one should
express agency of some form because that is what it is to be human, etc.). It seems that regardless of her approach she will be trapped by some discussion of free will/autonomy or demonstrating that the women are “resisting” westernization. However, I support the fact that Mahmood is
not trying to completely rid the discourse of discussion of freedom and resistance but rather she
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is exposing the shortcomings of a discourse that only recognize acts of freedom or resistance as
“true” manifestations of agency. It is not the case that the term “agency” itself is flawed, but its
use that is. To abandon the term would mean to abandon the very issues at hand (with secular
liberal discourse) that need to be addressed. The main concern in this section is the understanding that by revealing that the discourse is incomplete, it therefore needs improvement or reconsidering.
In most liberal discourses, agency is discussed in terms of freedom or free will (Mahmood 7). In other words, one is said to have agency when acting autonomously. The underlying
assumption made by these discourses is that agency only really exists where there is freedom or
when someone acts with free will against a particular social norm. Mahmood expands on this
approach to agency: “Agency, in this form of analysis, is understood as the capacity to realize
one’s own interests against the weight of custom, tradition, transcendental will, or other obstacles
(whether individual or collective). Thus the humanist desire for autonomy and self-expression
constitutes the substrate, the slumbering ember that can spark to flame in the form of an act of
resistance when conditions permit” (Mahmood 8). In these terms, the desire for freedom appears
to be innate to all humans. Mahmood explains and I agree that this desire becomes assumed and
taken for granted when studying human action. One of the problems with this assumption is that
it may lead directly to progressive politics which automatically blinds academics to seeing any
form of being or action other than in terms of resistance or acceptance of norms. Such a limited
view is irresponsible academics.
Treating freedom as a universal desire is problematic for several reasons. Consider the
dense philosophical history discussing freedom and what it means to be “free” or act “freely”.
Even though liberalism subscribes to a particular notion of freedom (in terms of autonomous
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will), it still cannot and should not be assumed to be universal for the same reason that liberalism
cannot be assumed as the discourse by which all of academia should take place. Second, “freedom” in the secular liberal sense that it is typically discussed is not a universal desire and only
became thought of as such relatively recently, after many years of being assumed by western liberal academics.
Mahmood expounds on why this assumption is problematic:
This positing of women’s agency as consubstantial with resistance to relations of domination, and the concomitant naturalization of freedom as a social ideal, are not simply analytical oversights on the part of feminist authors. Rather, I would argue that their assumptions reflect a deeper tension within feminism attributable to its dual character as both an analytical and a politically prescriptive project. (Mahmood 10)

In other words, the problem with this approach (approaching freedom as the end-all, be-all) remains dangerous because it is self-fulfilling: it is asserted and assumed as part of its role in prescribing political suggestions. Secular liberalism is not merely a descriptive project, rather it is
descriptive and prescriptive. So, instead of simply saying “all people desire freedom”, liberalism
says “all people desire freedom and any institution that prevents it should be dismantled or resisted” and therefore favors those actions that do so and locating agency in such actions. Part of
Mahmood’s project exposes the assumption that all people desire freedom in the liberal sense. I
agree with her argument here and add that it is not necessarily the case that all people lack the
desire for freedom, but rather the mistake is made when it is assumed that all people desire freedom. Furthermore, there are many different ways of understanding human actions other than in
terms of whether or not they represent freedom or a desire for freedom.
Mahmood explains that the dual characteristic of feminism (as analytical and politically
prescriptive) drives feminist projects not only to maintain freedom as the normative aim but also
to scrutinize anything that appears to obstruct or limit women’s freedom. Treating freedom as
the goal or aim of prescriptive projects forces all analysis to be viewed in terms of whether it
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does in fact constitute a free act or not. If it does not, the prescription is easy: get rid of it or oppose it. Those actors who fail to do so are said to be socialized or oppressed and have yet to realize their autonomous will or true desires.
Applying this method to the actions of the participants of the mosque movement is problematic because their acts seem to simply accept certain traditional religious norms that threaten
or obstruct their freedom to act as in modern society. It seems that Mahmood’s project calls feminists to first focus on their descriptive project and then let the political prescriptions arise on
their own. I agree with this assertion and aim to show how such a project may take place (Mahmood’s project is also an example). James’ book, for example, demonstrates how the approach
offered by Mahmood helps to locate agency in very particular aspects of the characters and
events in James’ story. The new “story” offered by Mahmood’s approach is much richer than
categorizing cricket as an institutionalized norm by which members of society become socialized. Mahmood herself employs the approach of observing then prescribing: she shows how
women in Cairo embody agency. Only after understanding this do the prescriptions arise or naturally manifest themselves.8 I will discuss these “prescriptions” in later sections but one prescriptive result is Mahmood’s criticism of feminist discourse.
Looking at the topic of agency in academic discourse, there are some projects that seem
to get closer to the mark in terms of what should be considered. One of those approaches is the
poststructural approach. There are several poststructural approaches to the topic of agency.
Here, I focus on those who criticize the liberal notion of autonomy (and the way it has become
naturalized in discourses on gender) (Mahmood 13). While there are different strands of

8

This is related to her discussion of what it means to act “politically” which I discuss in the next section. The main
point is that even though the acts of these women are not “political” in the way that nationalists would prescribe or
call for, they are political in the way that they successfully transform society or at least bring the women into the
social sphere. Think back to the “models of sociability” discussed in the introduction.
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poststructuralism, the most relevant to this project attempt to “redefine autonomy so as to capture
the emotional, embodied, and socially embedded character of people, particularly of women”
(Mahmood 13). Other poststructuralists aim at challenging the way rational thought is given so
much credence in finding the “autonomous self” showing how exclusive this approach is to other
bodily functions. I will spend more time on the specifics of these poststructuralists in the next
section; they are useful primarily for understanding the complexity behind what makes up a person or personhood. The poststructuralists expose the “autonomous self” and the false assumptions it relies on, allowing the academic greater flexibility in understanding what, in fact does,
make up human agency.
Mahmood argues, and I agree, that while these poststructuralists also criticize the treatment of the autonomous will as the normative liberated self, they still seem to characterize agency in relation to whether a social norm is subverted to or resignified. As a result, agency still
fails to escape being represented in terms of resistance or acceptance. For this reason, Mahmood
wants to push poststructuralists a bit further: “In other words, I will argue that the normative political subject of poststructuralist feminist theory often remains a liberatory one, whose agency is
conceptualized on the binary model of subordination and subversion” (Mahmood 14). The main
issue with this model is that those human actions that are not necessarily ones of repression or
resistance remain to be misconceived of and miscategorized. This is why Mahmood calls for the
notion of agency to be separated from progressive politics. In examples from James, I show how
to conceive of agency, one need not be quick to apply a larger conclusion or draw normative political prescription from it.
The first step in getting away from a liberatory notion of agency is to realize that the desire for freedom from, or subversion of, norms is not an innate desire and only became viewed as
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such relatively recently (Mahmood 14). One may then ask how human action should be studied
or treated. This is where I find Mahmood’s project particularly useful. Mahmood writes:
Put simply, my point is this: if the ability to effect change in the world and in oneself is historically and culturally specific…then the meaning and sense of agency cannot be fixed in advance, but must emerge
through an analysis of the particular concepts that enable specific modes of being, responsibility, and effectivity…In this sense, agentival capacity is entailed not only in those acts that resist norms but also in the
multiple ways in which one inhabits norms. (Mahmood 15)

Here, Mahmood is pointing out that the call to contextualize human action points to the very fact
that contextualization is meaningful simply because the subject and findings are different with
each endeavor. Human action isn’t necessarily meaningful because it is resistant to tradition or
custom unless you strictly analyze it from a lens that only recognizes those actions. Actions may
be meaningful because they stem from or are result of any number of situations or modes (bodily, emotional, rational, etc.), and whether they are resistant to or accept particular norms is irrelevant (or at least not the most important aspect of the action). I draw on these observations
when looking at James’ work.
I argue that by recognizing the transparency of the assumptions made by liberal discourses academics, specifically feminists, should be pushed to be more responsible in their discourse and the way that human actions are categorized or treated. One of the goals of feminists
is to explain what is going on in society (the descriptive part), too often this part fails when actions are miscategorized or overseen because they don’t fall into the limited categories offered by
the authors.
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2.1

Support from James’ Beyond a Boundary on critiquing the liberal notion of agency

I want to use certain parts of James’ book to show why a liberatory notion of agency
attributes agency to the wrong aspects of James’ story, or at least miscategorizes them. This
provides greater and broader support for Mahmood’s assertions regarding agency and liberal discourses that I laid out above. In addition, the examples in James bring the conversation to
broader topics of human action. In this section, I begin by showing how the liberal approach to
agency does not fit (or mistreats) these parts of his life. My point is simply that this exposes a
weakness in liberal discourse that demonstrates the need to come up with a more nuanced approach and categorization of agency.
James’ book is an interesting place to go for examples on this topic. On the surface, he
appears to be the perfect embodiment of showing that a resistance/acceptance conception of
agency can account for one’s life story. After all, he grew up in colonial Trinidad but became a
nationalist figure for independence. However, James actually lays out his story in very different
terms. I will begin by describing key parts of James’ book that do not fall into the category of
resistance or liberation. In the next section, I explain (in congruence with the terms Mahmood
uses) how these parts of James’ story help us construct a new way of approaching agency.
I find the first half of James’ book particularly useful for the category of agency because
of the unique approach he takes to describing his upbringing, the way he felt about it at the time,
and how it played (or failed to) into his future. This “upbringing” I refer to focuses on the people
in his life, where he lived, and his understanding of the way things were. These are all things
that seem like they should be considered as part of one’s “agency”. I am drawn to what seems to
be naturalness or honest approach to what some may call his autobiography. James does not
force himself to make sense of certain peculiarities that puzzled him; he finds those peculiarities
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meaningful as such. He describes someone or an event and comments on it with something
along the lines of “this always puzzled me” or “I always really enjoyed this” but he doesn’t force
the next step of stating why it was so or what this experience directly lead to. This ambivalence
seems to point to something interesting about human action prior to it being interpreted outside
persons.
In contrast to this ambivalence by James, secular liberal scholars seem very anxious to
decide whether a particular action or occurrence is a form of resistance or acceptance. If not,
then liberal discourse is quick to attribute an action to the larger social institutions or norms in
place. I find examples in James that fit neither of these categories. His ambivalence to certain
events exposes two things: first, that one should not necessarily feel forced to apply broader external meaning to an event, and second, that the secular liberal model is lacking and needs to
have a more nuanced account of agency in order to account for the “special” feature of events
like these in James’ story.
There are two primary examples of this “ambivalence” I reference in James’ book. At
different times, he demonstrates ambivalence toward his own agency and at other times he demonstrates ambivalence toward the agency of others. First, I’ll discuss an example of his ambivalence toward his own agency.
James’ young obsession with reading and his description of it is particularly interesting.
James describes his obsession just as it was: his mother was an avid novel reader (probably from
her days in the convent); he read whatever she put down, his father (a teacher) bought him the
classics and the occasional magazine with a cricketing story in it. This is where his obsession
gets interesting: “When we moved into Port of Spain, the capital, I read two daily papers and on
Sundays the green Sporting Chronicle and the red Sporting Opinion. I made clippings and filed
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them. It served no purpose whatever, I had never seen nor heard of anyone doing the like. I
spoke to no one about it and no one spoke to me” (James 17). This candid reflection on his habit
of collecting particular cricket stories is what draws me to James. He gives the reader the raw
experience of his obsession without cause or justification. Once again, I believe this to demonstrate some aspect of human action that should not be left out of considering agency. This obsession in its “raw” form seems to reveal a crucial aspect of his life. He continues:
Side by side with this obsession was another-Thackeray’s Vanity Fair. My mother had an old copy with a
red cover. I had read it when I was about eight, and of all the books that passed through that house this one
became my Homer and my bible. I read it through from the first page to the last, then started again, read to
the end and started again. Whenever I finished a new book I turned to my Vanity Fair. For years I had no
notion that it was a classical novel. I read it because I wanted to. So there I was, way out in the West Indies, before I was ten, playing games and running races like other little boys, but almost in secret devoting
my immense energies to the accumulation of facts and statistics about Grace and Ranjitsinhji, and reading
Vanity Fair on the average once every three months. What drew me to it? I don’t know, a phrase which
will appear often in this book. (James 17)

I find a few aspects of this excerpt useful for my project. First, the way James describes his obsession with Vanity Fair without providing rationale for the obsession. He simply states it, and
lets it sit there, keeping the reader ready for an explanation as to what drove this obsession or
what it represented (this hunger to know is probably representative of the need to categorize certain things in certain ways in liberal academia). Second, the fact that he is content in not knowing the answer to a lot of the questions he seems to know will come natural to people. This is the
ambivalence I am referring to characteristic of James’ story.
I find this aspect of the passage useful for my project because of the way that it denies (or
at the very least questions) recognition of something larger (a social institution or power) at work
here. This is not to say that it is an action that lacks agency; there are plenty of elements at work
here that possibly “drove” James’ obsession. Those elements are not necessarily larger than
himself and his desire to read. Sure, it is valuable that he had access to books to discover this obsession which is reliant on a number of political/social conditions, but these do not have the same
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effect on other people. After the fact, it may be easy for one to claim that what he read may or
may not set him up for what comes later, but James never mentions this. Instances or descriptions like this seems to locate the meaningful aspect of action in more mundane or natural parts
of action than an external interpretation that invokes how these feelings/actions relate to larger
social institutions. I simply want to show that this obsession, a very real and bold part of James’
life, is not necessarily an example or embodiment of resistance or acceptance of a norm. It
seems unsatisfactory however, for this obsession of his to be overlooked as an example of agency. This exposes one way in which the secular liberal account of agency is lacking.
Another aspect of James’ upbringing that demonstrates that the secular liberal conception
of agency needs reconstruction is his “dual personality” at his university. James was the youngest, at that point, to be admitted to Queens’ Royal College and with that came expectations of
great achievements. Once at the university his two obsessions (cricket and literature) were also
met with distinctive personalities: “Two people lived in me: one, the rebel against all family and
school discipline and order; the other, a Puritan who would have cut off a finger sooner than do
anything contrary to the ethics of the game” (James 28). James could not folly on the cricket
field, but was on a fast track to losing his scholarship in the classroom.
First, I will expand on the strict code of cricket James upheld. At the university, James
was brought up in the English public-school code. This is one aspect that James realized afterthe-fact but for my purposes only makes it more interesting. Although the code was meant to be
practiced in and out of the classroom, James recognizes that it had little success in the classroom
(James 25). Only on the cricket field did he and his classmates really embody this code. There
were boys from all different economic backgrounds and ethnicities who came together, not in the
classroom, but on the cricket field:
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Yet rapidly we learned to obey the umpire’s decision without question, however irrational it was. We
learned to play with the team, which meant subordinating your personal inclinations, and even interests, to
the good of the whole. We kept a stiff upper lip in that we did not complain about ill-fortune. We did not
denounce failures, but ‘Well tried’ or ‘Hard luck’ came easily to our lips. We were generous to opponents
and congratulated them on victories, even when we knew they did not deserve it. (James 25)

The secular liberal approach to agency may explain this phenomenon as a simple example of acceptance of certain social norms and traditions thrust upon the boys from an early age. It would
serve as an example that the boys were not enacting true agency on the cricket field, just the
norms and practices of the tradition they are being socialized into. James would be considered as
not fully realizing his autonomous will.
However, James’ portrayal of the dichotomy between the classroom and the cricket field
shows something very different than this secular liberal conception. While he may not deny that
he did, in fact, come to embody these norms and practices, it is not representative of him lacking
agency. The juxtaposition of the cricket field and classroom in James’ life is big enough to show
that what happened on the cricket field (how he came to embody a particular moral code) is a
key part of James’ life that should not be rendered insubstantial (or as representative of his “immature” relation to his autonomous will) because it may appear as an “acceptance” of norms rather than a resistance to them. In fact, cricket seems to be the greatest player in the forming of
James’ agency and therefore should not be discounted simply because it may be categorized as a
form of non-resistance on James’ part.
In regard to cricket at the university (and it falling outside the classroom), James writes:
“To all this I took as a young duck to water. The organizing of boys into elevens, the selection
of teams, the keeping of scores, all that I had been doing at second-hand with Grace and Ranjitsinhji and Trumper I now practiced in real life with real people” (James 26). I will discuss this
connection to cricket in greater detail in the later sections but I find it important here to under-
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stand that from a young age, even before this, James felt connected to cricket and was fascinated
even by watching it and hearing about the players from his parents.
On the flip side, he was a rebel against the code in the classroom: “The striking thing was
that inside the classrooms the code had little success. Sneaking was taboo, but we lied and
cheated without any sense of shame. I know I did” (James 25). Here, James admits that the public school code he was supposed to be socialized into failed in the classroom. This is an instant
that secular liberals would easily categorize as a form of agency because it appears to be an example of resistance against a larger social institution or tradition.
I contend that this “rebelliousness” should not be treated strictly in terms of resistance either. James demonstrates that this aspect of his university experience is representative of their
experience as a group of “heterogeneous jumble of Trinidad battered and jostled and shaken
down into some sort of order” (even though it was not successful in the classroom) (James 25).
This is relevant in that even though it may be “resistant” to certain norms, it is not that way because of some sort of autonomous will at work and the more interesting or accurate account
comes out when one considers the emotional reasoning behind James’ behavior in school. He
describes his attitude toward the classroom almost as having no use for it. He read everything
that was intended for him to read but on his own clock and with his own agenda. He found that
he actually knew more about or had a deeper understanding of the work than the boys who did
what “they were supposed to”.
James seems to be pointing to some intrinsic aspect of him that drove this rebelliousness,
perhaps a unique “spirit” or personality trait not necessarily related to an autonomous will. It
seems that he had little patience or time for the formalities of school and preferred to read his
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favorite literature (not necessarily “recreational”) on his own terms rather than the university’s.
Once again, a weakness in the secular liberal approach is exposed.
These examples show weaknesses in the secular liberal approach to agency. By strictly
conceiving of agency in terms of resistance/acceptance many nuances of human action and life
are misconceptualized. As Mahmood hints at, a conception of agency should be as complex as
human life that it is aiming to describe.
This critique of the liberal approach to agency (only using terms of resistance/acceptance
leads to missing key aspects of human life) also helps understand some of the main concerns I
originally had with Mahmood’s project. First, as I mentioned in my introduction, it worried me
that Mahmood wants to hang onto the term “agency” to describe what is going on in the women’s mosque movement. I thought that the safer approach would be to get rid of the terms that
appear to be locked up in liberal notions of freedom, autonomy, and resistance. However, by
using other examples like those in James’ book to show that the current approach to agency is
simply lacking, or incomplete, it becomes clear that agency isn’t necessarily bound up in these
secular liberal terms and therefore can successfully be thought of and used without these accompanying entrenchments in secular liberal assumptions.
I specifically want to respond to and critique the tendency of secular liberal discourse to
categorize agency in strict terms of resisting social norms and institutions. If agency remains to
be favor those actions which resist or act out against social norms, most actions will be categorized as examples of the power that dominant society has over its subjects’ actions which reinforce the society’s norms and institutions. Similarly, Mahmood wants to cut the cord between
agency and the larger assumptions of secular liberalism it is typically tied up with. The institution of secular liberalism and its accompanying values and prescriptions have been assumed for
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so long and tread so deep that terms of agency in feminist discourse are just one effect of secular
liberalism that needs to be exposed.
I also was not convinced that Mahmood could successfully use secular liberal terms of
resistance/acceptance to show that agency is neither of these. Hasn’t the liberal approach
“worked” for so long because most human action can be conceived of in these terms? To truly
get away from them it seems that she would be required to get rid of the terms which lie so deep
in the discourse. However, my main point must be rearticulated here. It is not the case that actions never represent forms of resistance or acceptance. Rather, I argue that only conceiving of
agency in terms of resistance or acceptance does not provide a complete toolbox for understanding the complexity of human action. Furthermore, the categories implicit in the liberal discourse
as it stands are treated with strict boundaries and little room for flexibility. The examples I reference above from James should expose the fact that a system with rigid boundaries and a strict
approach to human agency will fail in its attempt to describe what human features are truly at
work. The point remains somewhat simple: resistance and acceptance are not the only accurate
descriptions of agency. To treat them as such would be to miss a much more interesting story
that James is telling. This, in itself, shows the need for a more nuanced conception of agency.

28

3

CONSIDERING OTHER APPROACHES TO AGENCY

Now that I established that agency should not be strictly conceived of in terms of resistance
and acceptance I want to consider what describing agency should consider. In the previous section I discussed the problems with the dominant secular liberal approach to agency and how it
fails to account for what I believe to be embodiments of agency. In this section I discuss how
one may approach the discussion and consideration of agency. I use Mahmood’s project to set
the foundation for this conversation and then use examples from James’ work to show how
Mahmood’s suggestions are helpful.
I begin by laying out some approaches to topics of agency that help point to what I find will
be a useful conception of agency. Mahmood gives good and relevant summaries of these approaches that I also use. The main approaches are Michel Foucault’s theory of “subjectivation”
and Judith Butler’s points regarding language and performative actions.
Rather than being conceived of in terms of resistance or acceptance, agency should be discussed in terms of how someone embodies certain norms with particular human capacities. The
easiest way to think of this “embodiment” is in terms of subject formation (Mahmood 13). I will
expand on what this means and then discuss why I find this suggestion helpful.
The main point is that agency can be demonstrated in the “multiple ways in which one inhabits norms” (Mahmood 15). In this view, norms are not seen as the oppressive entity to be acted
against but a means for embodying one’s agency through several different approaches and connections to the norms.
For example, consider the women of the mosque movement that were the focus of Mahmood’s study. The mosque movement women live their lives aimed at realizing piety. The practices of these women, such as daily prayer and veiling, serve as great examples of what the vari-
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ous ways a norm can be embodied because some of their actions are grounded in Islamic orthodoxy, others in norms of liberal discourse, some from familial authority, and others in state institutions (Mahmood 15). The practices of these women are neither a reinscription of traditional
roles (they have been reconfigured for these women) nor can they be understood strictly in terms
of gender equality or resistance to male authority which are the tools that a liberal approach provides us for understanding such acts.
Discussing Butler and Foucault’s work is helpful here. I use Mahmood’s treatment of Foucault to help understand his contribution to understanding what makes up “subject formation”
which is clearly connected to the agency I want to be part of the discourse. I use Mahmood’s
treatment of Judith Butler’s work to understand the complexity of performative actions. The rituals performed by the women of the mosque movement and the careful techniques of the players in James’ book both have aspects that Butler’s “performativity” speaks to.
Foucault’s fundamental critique that is relevant here is of the way that power is typically understood: as a static entity thrust upon a pre-existing and static subject. He suggests that it is
more accurate to understand power as a relationship that creates a subject and its identity dynamically.9 This requires the realization that people and their “identities” are formulated with every
action, relationship, and encounter. One’s “agency” is not predetermined nor does it necessarily
determine the form that their agency may take, but is simultaneously formed by these actions.
Especially useful here is Foucault’s discussion of subjectivation. Subjectivation can be
thought of as the process by which someone comes to be “who they are”. Mahmood summarizes
subjectivation: “the very processes and conditions that secure a subject’s subordination are also
the means by which she becomes a self-conscious identity and agent. Stated otherwise, one may
9

Foucault, Michel. 1972 The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. Trans. R. Hurley. New York: Pantheon Books &
Foucault, Mechel. 1980. Truth and Power. In Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977,
ed. And trans, C. Gordon, 109—33. New York: Pantheon Books.
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argue that the set of capacities inhering in a subject-that is, the abilities that define her modes of
agency-are not the residue of an undominated self that existed prior to the operations of power
but are themselves the products of those operations” (Mahmood 17). This may sound a bit like
the “chicken or the egg” dilemma in terms of agency and power relations. The secular liberal
approach to agency seems to assume that humans are, or possess, a fixed identity (or at least an
autonomous will) that moves around separate from its surroundings and capable of deciding
what and how to interact with and be affected by. Foucault’s theory of subjectivation problematizes this approach to agency and relationships by revealing that humans are nothing but those
relations and interactions that come to make them “who they are”.
In terms of agency then and the conception of agency I want to encourage because it
seems to map onto the events in James’ book as well views events or actions as forms of subjectivation. So, in each action, one is simultaneously recreating him or herself as a subject. Therefore there is no fixed outcome of the particular event, rather the main things at play are the aspects of himself or herself put into the action. This is where Judith Butler’s concept of the “performative” is helpful.
Given this understanding of subject formation, one can see that agency is formed by and
executed not only in relations of subordination but rather from and by a myriad of relations. This
leads to Mahmood’s discussion of Judith Butler. Butler is useful for understanding what then, or
how power relations constitute the subject. Rather than focusing on the autonomy of the individual (an entity separate from the social) as most feminists do, Butler begins to examine the
conditions that sustain this “contemporary individuality” (Mahmood 18).
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Butler specifically focuses on challenging the sex/gender dichotomy that most of feminist
debate is based on.10 Her main argument is that the dichotomy is based upon the assumption that
there is a pre-representational sexed body prior to the cultural inscription of gender. In other
words, because of the way that gender is deeply practiced and inscribed in norms, gender is necessarily tied up with sex in some form. She takes this criticism a step further by claiming that
gender discourse also fails to be strictly representational because it is tied up with what it is referring to. More simply, it seems to be impossible to genuinely speak about gender without invoking all of its baggage with it.
Because of this, Butler focuses on language as a system that produces subjects. This is
helpful for my project because of its role in developing what it means for an action to be “performative”. I use the “performative” aspect of actions to point to the approach one should have
with the actions relevant to agency. Her discussion draws upon the notion of performativity as
discussed by Derrida and J.L. Austin. The main point here is that the performative has a reiterative power that allows it to appear as an interior part of the subject and “further consolidate the
heterosexual imperative” (Mahmood 19). In other words, when a person performs a norm, they
simultaneously portray that norm (along with everything the norm signifies or represents) as an
innate part of them and serve as proof of the heterosexual imperative the norms constitute.
Mahmood writes: “In contrast to a long tradition of feminist scholarship that treated norms as an
external social imposition that constrain the individual, Butler forces us to rethink this externalinternal opposition by arguing that social norms are the necessary ground through which the subject is realized and comes to enact her agency” (Mahmood 19). Butler helps challenge the conception of norms that treats them as an external entity which a subject can choose to resist or ac-

10

For more on this see: Butler, Judith. 1993. Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of “sex.” New York:
Routledge and 1997. Excitable Speech: A politics of the performative. New York: Routledge.

32

cept. The fact remains that this “subject” is already part and a result of the culture these norms
constitute and therefore to view every action as either an example of it being resisted or accepted
is misplaced.
Butler’s suggestions regarding language are also useful for what they expose about the
“performative” aspect of actions. Academics are required to partake in a discourse in which language and certain words come to invoke certain meanings and deeper invocations. This was my
original concern with Mahmood’s decision to seemingly try and reinvent or reconceive of the
term “agency” which is muddled up in a history of uses she wants to avoid. However, the focus
of her project and my project needs to remain in focus: to provide a broader conception of these
terms that exposes the rigid boundaries assumed by liberal discourse.
Butler’s theory of the subject as bound up with norms and relationships informs her conception of agency. The stability of norms is reliant on their iteration and the more they are iterated, the more stable they are and likely to be reiterated. Mainly, there are countless reasons
that a norm may be iterated other than to stabilize it. Once again, the structure or even existence
of the norm is not the primary concern here (this is in opposition to most liberal feminist treatment of norms). Rather, the main point is that the performative aspect of norms or language will
obviously be bound up with larger institutions but that is not necessarily what makes them meaningful, nor is the fact of whether the act is an instance of resistance or acceptance. Mahmood
helps summarize this point: “To the degree that the stability of social norms is a function of their
repeated enactment, agency for Butler is grounded in the essential openness of each iteration and
the possibility that it may fail or be reappropriated or resignified for purposes other than the consolidation of norms” (Mahmood 19). Just as each enactment can fail, so can any social forma-
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tion or norm, but this remains fairly uninteresting compared to understanding the particular relationships at work in each person’s performance of a norm.
While Butler’s critique is very useful for exposing the relationship of norms and their iterability and deep ties to larger institutions, it needs to be pushed further by abandoning the strict
discussion in terms of destabilizing norms. Norms are more complex than what a binary (resistance/acceptance) conception can account for. This pushes Mahmood’s main argument: that
agency should refer to and take into consideration the complexity of norms and the various ways
people can relate to and perform them, rather than merely discussing norms in terms of doing or
undoing them. Mahmood pushes us to think about and consider the variety of ways norms are
“lived and inhabited, aspired to, reached for, and consummated” (Mahmood 23). Recognizing
this “variety of forms” pushes a new approach to conceiving of agency that I find helpful in conceiving of James’ story.
I want to spend some time clarifying why I use the terms “subjectivation” and “performative” as developed by Foucault and Butler, respectively. It seems that the payoff for using technical terms like these stems from the context in which they were developed. First, subjectivation
as part of Foucault’s discourse is rooted in the same spirit as Mahmood’s project: to push or
question the typical assumptions of liberal discourse. The term “subjectivation” itself then is tied
up with all the questions that Mahmood also wants to pose. Similarly, the term “performative,”
used by Butler is tied up with her challenges to liberal discourse and the dichotomies it is based
on.
The fact that these terms are technical forces the reader to engage with the discourse in
which they were originally used. This fact seems to be the case and point for each of these authors: that you cannot (even in academia) claim to use a term without invoking the surrounding
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discourse or presumptions of those discourses. By using these terms, the reader cannot simply
rely on his or her readily available toolbox of vocabulary to understand what the author is referring to. Instead, the reader is forced to re-conceive of his or her toolbox in order to understand
what is at stake and being referenced. If Foucault, Butler, and Mahmood only invoked nontechnical terms that seem easier to grasp, they would be forced to participate in the very discourse they are trying to rebuild. At some point, technical terms seem necessary to point to the
new direction the discourse should be taken.
Now that I have discussed both terms as used by their authors, I want to focus on Mahmood’s use of them and how the terms are related because I will then show how they help in
conceiving of James’ story. Simply stated, the term “subjectivation” as developed by Foucault
refers to the way in which one comes to be the subject that he or she is. As I explained above in
terms of iteration, this is a dynamic process that is constantly in flux. There is no definite or preset aspect of a person such as the autonomous will; rather a person at every moment and in every
instance or interaction is contributing to subject formation in this process of subjectivation.
“Subjectivation” resists the liberal tendency to conceive of subjects as fixed entities. “Performative”, as developed by Butler, refers to the way in which one performs or invokes (or does not
perform/invoke) social norms. This conception of norms pushes against the typical liberal tendency to conceive of norms as an institution thrust upon its subject to either accept or deny. This
performative aspect of norms is useful, not because of what it says about norms being invoked or
not but rather because thinking of norms as being performed allows one to begin to understand
the variety of ways people may come to relate to norms.
These two terms are related in how they both can be connected to agency to understand it
deeper than the liberal discourse suggests. Mahmood utilizes certain aspects of both these terms
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to develop her project on conceiving of agency. For Mahmood, both of these technical terms
help point to how she wants to conceive of agency. Like Foucault and Butler, Mahmood wants
to push against liberal assumptions about agency and these terms help to avoid the discourse she
is wary of. Illuminating the relationship between “subjectivation” and “performative” helps to
point to what she is trying to do. The two are most obviously related in the sense that a performative action is part of one’s subjectivation. In other words, by performing or not performing
certain norms one is simultaneously forming themselves as a subject. Below, I use examples
from Mahmood’s work in Cairo to show how she sees these terms at work. Both seems to be
present in what the women of the mosque movement say about Muslim rituals like daily prayer,
fasting during Ramadan, and veiling for women. These women are called not simply to partake
in such rituals but rather, to make them their own and a part of their everyday being and personality. It is not enough to merely wear a veil, one is called to let the wearing of the veil be part
of your personhood and aid in the modest approach one is called to have in all interactions. In
doing so, the practitioner is simultaneously performing a norm (both physically and “mentally”)
and in doing so contributing to her subject formation. With each practice of this, it becomes
more natural or inundated in her being or subject.
Mahmood’s project focuses on specifically “religious” examples (Muslim rituals) to
demonstrate the ways in which the terms “subjectivation” and “performative” help capture what
is going on in the women’s mosque movement. The key points Mahmood wants to demonstrate
are the many ways in which “norms are lived and inhabited, aspired to, reached for, and consummated” (Mahmood 23). She writes: “As I will argue below, this in turn requires that we explore the relationship between the immanent form a normative act takes, the model of subjectivity it presupposes (specific articulations of volition, emotion, reason, and bodily expression), and
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the kinds of authority upon which such an act relies” (Mahmood 23). In simpler terms, agency
can be made up of or consists at least in part of, how people relate to norms. The modes or ways
that one can relate to norms are seemingly endless and this is what drives the call for a more
complex system for conceiving of agency. Sure, norms may be resisted or accepted but the more
interesting story comes from exploring how they are either resisted or accepted. In each act then,
some model of subjectivity is at work and thereby being recreated. The focus on virtues in the
mosque movement helps to articulate these points, I will now discuss how.
The virtue of female modesty is a key one in the mosque movement. Generally, participants agree that modesty should be sought after. The focus of discussion is how modesty should
be enacted and more specifically, whether the donning of the veil is required. Discussing this
debate, modesty may be considered the “norm” and the veil to be the bodily “form” it may take.
The question lies in whether the “veiled body” is the necessary performative action by which
one acquires modesty. Modesty is part of the subjectivation desired by the participants: the aim
of one’s participation in certain performative actions for a particular subject formation. For
those who do not believe the veil to be a necessary component for practicing modesty, they
maintain there are other effective forms the embodiment of modesty may take that will still result
in the same subjectivation. This is significant because each view necessarily has a different conception of the ways in which norms are practiced.
This observation leads Mahmood to the conclusion that the binary logic (acceptance/resistance) of noting whether norms are done or undone fails to account for particulars in
subjectivation and performativity. Mahmood wants to be able to understand persons in terms of
their political anatomy which is layered and complex. To understand the complexity of subject
formation Mahmood encourages the reader to look at both the moral ethical actions practiced and
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further, to understand how these actions contribute to various subject formations (Mahmood 24).
In other words, just as there are a variety of ways a norm can be practiced, there are just as many
(if not more) subjects formed from those actions.
Generally, I agree with Mahmood that the more interesting and accurate way to talk
about and think about agency is by looking at the various ways people inhabit norms. Later, by
using examples from James, I demonstrate that it seems to be commonplace in life that what
makes a person a person or “subject” (in the sense of “subjectivation”) are the particular details
about their experience with norms or social values, how they interact with them, what they mean
to them (or don’t mean to them), etc. The strict favoring of discussing whether the norms are
resisted or conceded to attribute the action to perhaps only one or few modes of connectivity to
the norm rather than the whole picture. Further, this unfavorable approach further indoctrinates
ways of thinking that lead to political prescriptions that are seemingly based on false observations regarding said norms. Prior to going into examples from James, I want to discuss the relation that discourse on agency has to first, ethics and second, politics. Placing agency in terms of
action and how one acts has clear parallels to both of these topics and therefore needs to be explored.
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3.1

What does this mean for acting “ethically”?

These points regarding action and subject formation raise questions that are rooted in traditional ethical discourse: are only certain subjects capable of being “ethical subjects”, is an act
only said to be “ethical” under strict performative guidelines? As Foucault and Butler’s work
was used above to help in the discussion of how people relate to norms, so Kant and Aristotle
will be used here to aid in discussing ethics. First, I lay out what seems to be the dominant Kantian approach to ethics that, in this light, seems to have shortcomings.
The Kantian approach to ethics focuses primarily on certain rules for action. Rarely
then, are the specifics of a particular action considered. The Kantian approach favors reason
over habits, virtue, and things like character formation.11 This is problematic for several reasons,
one of which Mahmood makes explicit: “One consequence of this Kantian conception of ethics
is the relative lack of attention paid to the manifest form ethical practices take, and a general demotion of conduct, social demeanor, and etiquettes in our analyses of moral systems” (Mahmood
26). For Kant, an act can only be said to be moral if it is the result of rational thought perhaps
against one’s intuitions or feelings. In this form, ethics becomes more like following a rule:
“you are to do x in y circumstances” rather than an action that is a result of one’s agency (although surely that would make up part of the rational process).
Mahmood suggests, and I support this argument, that the Aristotelian approach to ethics
is more helpful than the Kantian approach in conceiving of the complex and variety of forms
human agency typically takes. The Aristotelian tradition recognizes that morality is “realized
through, and manifest in, outward behavioral forms” (Mahmood 25). These “behavioral forms”
can include or stem from any variety of human inclinations, feelings, habits, or volitions. It is
11

For more on this critique of humanist ethics generally and Kant specifically see Minson, Jeffrey. 1993. Questions
of Conduct: Sexual harassment, citizenship, government. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
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obvious why this approach would be better suited for conceiving of actions that don’t fall neatly
into the binary of resistance/acceptance, especially those religious practices Mahmood studied.
Human actions generally, and how they relate to norms specifically, do not treat every action in
terms of a rule (although this could be attributed to actions from the outside), and to assume so
misses a much richer understanding of social human relations. Religious practices seem to need
a model of agency that accounts for the connection between outward bodily practices and beliefs
so the appealing nature of the Aristotelian approach should seem obvious.
Still, Mahmood wants to push the Aristotelian approach further and for good reason. She
uses yet another Foucauldian approach to help do this.12 This conception of ethics she points to
may be referred to as a “positive conception of ethics” (as coined by Claire Colebrook). This
approach to ethics considers the practices, bodies, and selves involved in certain actions. So, instead of being focused on whether a particular action can be universalized or what one’s end goal
may be, the focus is on “ethics as always local and particular, pertaining to a specific set of procedures, techniques, and discourses through which highly specific ethical-moral subjects come to
be formed” (Mahmood 28). This approach pushes one to engage with the subject on every level,
rather than merely observing his or her action in terms of a rule.
This approach has larger implications for the meaning of ethics that carries over into the
actions that Mahmood observes in the participants in the mosque movement. First, this approach
takes what it means to act “ethically” beyond whether or not one abides by a particular rule. In
this approach, ethics is no longer adherence to a rule but enacted by a performative action to
achieve a certain subjectivation. While this may seem to be an over-generalized conception, it

12

See Foucault, Michel. 1997. On the genealogy of ethics: An overview of work in progress. In Ethics: Subjectivity
and Truth: Vol. 1 of Essential Woks of Foucault, 1954-1984, ed. P. Rabinow, trans. R Hurley et al. New York: New
Press.
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makes room for understanding greater intricacies of action. In other words, ethics is the mode by
which a person is able to be active in their subjectivation (through performative actions).
The key here is that this conception of ethics does not require a person to be an autonomous and/or voluntaristic being as the liberal approach does. It may be the case that the person is,
but it is not required and there is room for someone to act ethically even if his or her actions are
rooted in tradition or culture and the institutions that make them up. Regarding this, Mahmood
explains:
For Foucault, the relationship between moral codes and modes of subjectivation is not over determined,
however, in the sense that the subject simply complies with moral codes (or resists them). Rather, Foucault’s framework assumes that there are many different ways of forming a relationship with a moral code,
each of which establishes a particular relationship between capacities of the self (will, reason, desire, action, and so on) and a particular norm. (Mahmood28-29)

So, the way in which one interacts with a moral code has potential for greater complexity than
simply whether he or she complies with or resists them. Sure, this requires greater analysis of a
particular action and the subject involved, but there really is no other way to understand what
really is at work with a particular action if this analysis is not performed. To understand the ethical subject formed by a certain action, one must understand all of the players at work in that particular action. Mahmood continues the above excerpt:
The precise embodied form that obedience to a moral code takes is not a contingent but a necessary element of ethical analysis in that it is a means to describing the specific constitution of the ethical subject. In
other words, it is only through an analysis of the specific shape and character of ethical practices that one
can apprehend the kind of ethical subject that is formed. These practices are technical practices for Foucault and include corporeal and body techniques, spiritual exercises, and ways of conducting oneself- all of
which are “positive” in the sense that they are manifest in, and immanent to, everyday life. (Mahmood 29)

This more positive conception of ethics distinguishes between acting in such a way that follows a
rule versus inhabiting a norm. I want to spend some more time considering what is really being
distinguished here and why one seems to be more favorable than the other when conceiving of
agency. Clarifying this will help to understand why this approach is useful for conceiving of
Mahmood’s experience with the mosque movement and James’ story.
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When ethics is examined in terms of whether or not a particular rule is enacted, the very person acting is pretty much taken out of the picture. I say this because whether or not the subject
follows a rule has little to do with who they are and why they did it. It could be anyone at any
time obeying or resisting a rule and it will not be more or less significant who is doing the acting.
This seems to be fundamentally against the very spirit of ethical studies. This approach fails to
account for not only the person doing the acting and their mindset/character while performing,
but also the type of person formed as a result of the action.
On the other hand, the “positive” approach to ethics focuses on the way norms are inhabited
by a person. In other words, the performative aspect of the action is considered rather than merely the result of the action. Since the performative can take many different forms, the academic is
forced to consider what specific mode this took and further, the role it plays in the subjectivation
of the actor. It is for this very reason that this approach to ethics is more applicable to a conception of agency than the Kantian approach to ethics.
Specifically looking at the mosque movement, it becomes clear that while all of the participants have similar teleological beliefs/aims, they embody different practices (or the same practices with different volitions or emotions attached to them) for achieving this aim. This is what
makes the mosque movement unique, there is no centralized authority prescribing how one must
practice or embody these moral codes. Rather, individuals are expected and pushed to realize
their divine plan in their own way. They are encouraged especially to realize this through bodily
practices, or what we can refer to as performative actions of the body. Mahmood writes: “For
the mosque participants, it is the various movements of the body that comprise the material substance of the ethical domain. There exists an elaborate system of techniques by which the body’s
actions and capacities can be examined and worked upon, both individually and collectively”
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(Mahmood 31). The complexities of a particular action can be understood only once one considers all of the volitions that go into it. It seems then that there are infinite possibilities for creative
attachment and practicing of norms, the limits of which may only be created by the participants.
I’ll now consider the example of Muslim women donning the veil in relation to the norm of
modesty in terms of these various approaches to ethics. The Kantian conception of ethics may
observe the donning of the veil by mosque participants as an example of the way in which these
religious practitioners follow the prescriptions of their religion. Those who do not wear the veil,
the Kantian approach would argue, chose not to follow that prescription of her religion. The
academic may choose to expand on the reasoning behind the choice of the practitioner but the
focus will remain on the why rather than the how of the practitioner coming to embody this performative practice or not.
More than this being an extremely limited perspective on the practice, it lacks the ability to
recognize the pieces that made such a result. Furthermore, it would appear under this Kantian
approach that the donning or failure to don the veil is representative of the participant’s dedication or subservience to her religion. However, as the other approaches to ethics show, just because someone does not don the veil does not mean she rejects or is less dedicated to her religion
(or her modesty) than someone who does wear the veil. Now, I’ll consider the same practice but
under a more Foucauldian approach, which Mahmood also employed and I find more useful.
Mahmood points out that the donning of the veil does not necessarily speak to the individual’s relationship with her religion. In fact, someone who does not wear the veil may do so after a
long interaction with her religious discourse, other practices, and interaction with her fellow
practitioners. Note however, that this is still not necessarily favoring rationality over practice as
the Kantian tradition does. In regard to this critique Mahmood asserts: “Even though I focus on
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the practices of the mosque participants, this does not mean that their activities and the operations that they perform on themselves are products of their independent wills; rather, my argument is that these activities are the products of authoritative discursive traditions whose logic and
power far exceeds the consciousness of the subjects they enable” (Mahmood 32). Moreover, she
is primarily focused on the virtue of modesty and embodying it to form herself as a modest subject than she is with the veil itself. The veil is a contingent part to modesty and her religion rather than a necessary one. If she finds a bodily practice that is more suitable for forming herself
as a modest subject, she is encouraged to practice it. In order to demonstrate how intricate the
considerations are for the donning of the veil for the mosque participants, I will now focus on
Mahmood’s observation of the mosque participants in regard to considering the donning of the
veil.
Recall that a primary concern for practitioners of the mosque movement is the “folklorization
of Islam”. In other words, they are concerned with the tendency for their religious practices to
become mere customs in the wake of living in a modern society. Mahmood conducted fieldwork
at six different mosques in Cairo and discusses the major differences found among at least three
of them. The Umar mosque is located in an upper-middle-income neighborhood of Cairo. The
women who are practitioners of the mosque movement here, attend weekly religious lessons given by a woman teacher: Hajja Faiza. At this particular mosque, Mahmood notes the striking variety in dress among the women attending. While some wear tailored ankle-length skirts, tucked
in blouses and chiffon scarves around their heads, others wear dark colored long coats with thick
scarves covering their head and neck. The other popular veil is the khimar, which covers the
head and extends over the torso. Still others don’t cover their heads and are dressed in jeans and
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short tops and wear make-up. Very few, if any, wear the niqab which is the most conservative
form of veil that covers the face (Mahmood 41).
They Ayesha mosque differs from the Umar mosque in both location and audience. It is in a
large and very poor neighborhood of Cairo where most residents receive welfare assistance. The
lessons here are less formal, “For example, women attendees often interrupt the teacher to ask
questions or to put forward alternative opinions they have heard elsewhere. There is constant
banter back and forth between the da’iya (religious teacher) and her audience” (Mahmood 42).
About one third of the women at this mosque wear crumpled ankle-length gowns or the conservative niqab rarely seen in the Umar mosque while the majority wears printed headscarves or
a loose black gown and thin black headscarf tightly wrapped around the head (Mahmood 42).
The third mosque that stands in contrast to both of these is the Nafisa mosque. This mosque
is in a prominent suburb of Cairo and has the largest number of females attending of any mosque
in Cairo. At this mosque, the vast majority wear the conservative niqab.
The striking contrast between these three mosques accentuates the question: “what is it that
informs each of these women’s dress?” The answer to this, Mahmood demonstrates, is not simple and can only be answered by looking at a variety of approaches to religious discourse available to these women. Regarding the women of the Nafisa mosque, Mahmood writes: “Women
who wear the niqab understand their practice to accord with a strict interpretation of Islamic
edicts on female modesty, and often see themselves as more virtuous than women who wear the
khimar or the hijab” (other forms of the veil), (Mahmood 43). So, what then, are the other women’s thoughts on modesty?
The answer to this must be considered in light of the fact that the primary motivation for the
mosque movement is to revive Muslim religious practices independent of the changes in Cairo’s
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rapidly changing society. The participants aim to have their daily practices serve Islamic principles. This may seem like an obvious aspect of most religions, however it is especially telling
for the mosque movement practitioners in Cairo because of the changes taking place in their society. The women’s mosque movement may be considered a response to the feeling that their
religious practices became marginalized in the “westernization” or “modernization” of their society.
The participants are resistant to letting their religion become simply an abstract system of beliefs that are merely practiced as a custom rather than as the religious practices meant to inform
and fill their everyday lives. Consider the difference between wearing a veil because you grew
up wearing one and your family wears it, in contrast to understanding and embodying the religious purposes behind wearing the veil. Mahmood wants to resist the tendency to characterize
these motivations as mere examples of asserting cultural identity or religious distinctiveness, and
I agree with her argument here. Rather, as Mahmood demonstrates, an alternative reading is
more informative of the mosque participant’s motivations. The alternative reading, suggested by
Mahmood, recognizes the main concern of the mosque participants: that their religion gets cheapened when it is treated as the practicing of abstract values unrelated to everyday “practical” life
(Mahmood 45). The aim of projects attempting to understand the agency at work as suggested
here and by Mahmood, is to focus on the way these otherwise seeming “abstract” practices are
actually practical and affect everyday interactions: “The daiyat and the mosque attendees want to
ameliorate this situation (the tendency for their practices to be characterized as abstract) through
the cultivation of those bodily aptitudes, virtues, habits, and desires that serve to ground Islamic
principles within the practices of everyday living” (Mahmood 45, parentheses mine). The participants use the mosque lessons as training for these daily religious practices.
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Hajja Faiza, the teacher from the Umar mosque understands this problem to lie in the fact
that the religious practices of the mosque movement members have been separated from the sacred religious texts from which they originate. Note that this does not locate the problem with
educating the practitioners on basic performance of religious practices, because most of them
practice them. However, the problem is that the majority and remainder of their everyday lives
remain separated from their religious beliefs. Hajja Faiza emphasizes practice in her lessons in
order to address how one is to make Muslim moral precepts a part of one’s everyday life. The
sacred texts are used to form the practical rules for everyday life.
The mosque teachers are partaking in a discourse that has been a part of the Islamic juridical
tradition, for some time: that discourse which distinguishes between those acts of worship and
those that relate to living in society. Even more telling about these mosque teachers is that despite how difficult it may seem to embody the Islamic practices in a modern society, they are not
calling practitioners to separate or withdraw themselves from society. Rather, Mahmood writes:
“Indeed, the form of piety women like Hajja Faiza advocate brings religious obligations and rituals to bear upon worldly issues in new ways, thereby according the old Islamic adage ‘all of
life is worship’ a new valence” (Mahmood 47). Note that this approach to everyday life isn’t a
direct hit at the political order in Cairo but if its practitioners follow the way of life they are advocating, the sociopolitical institutions and ethos will necessarily be affected. In other words, it
is not necessarily teaching against the secular order of the society, but rather, helping to revive in
each participant the daily practices they should aim to embody. With this, they call for institutions to allow this sort of “religious education” and encourage Islamic awareness in various social institutions. I discuss this “political” aspect in more detail below.
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The point remains that for the mosque participants, their aim for practices is to realize Islamic virtues in their lives, not simply to develop the appearance of an Islamic identity. Many of the
practices of Islam are meant to serve the development of shaping a certain ethical identity but in
modern society, as it is pushing in Cairo, they tend to serve more as markers of identity. In regard to the veil specifically, any failure to understand “how the practice of veiling is an integral
part of an entire manner of existence through which one learns to cultivate the virtue of modesty
in all aspects of one’s life” misses the driving force behind veiling (Mahmood 51). Compare this
opinion of mosque participants to the opinion of Adil Hussein, the late general secretary of the
Islamist Labor Party: he values the veil as a symbol of Islamist identity and a marker of their society (Mahmood 52). Note the distinction between the focus of mosque participants on developing piety via the veil and Adil Hussein on valuing it as a signifier of their society’s identity. I
use the different approaches to show that within veiling alone there are many different forms
agency can take. The debates within the mosque movement about what is necessary or not to
practice veiling demonstrate the various forms of agency in the one practice. It is not necessarily
a matter of whether one veils or not but how they veil and the accompanying theoretical (or lack
thereof) beliefs. I should note here that I don’t assert that certain forms are representative of
whether a participant has more or less agency, but that they both probably do, just in different
forms.
Underlying this important distinction are implications regarding agency and what it means or
what form agency takes for the mosque participants. While portrayal of a certain identity in society is important, it is not sufficient for understanding what makes up a participant’s agency.
Rather, the internal approaches (or attachments) to a particular practice and the affect or role it
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plays in their lives overall are what need to be considered in understanding the participants’
agency.
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3.2

What does this mean for acting “politically”?

The distinction between the approaches of the mosque participants to Muslim practices versus the approach of political figures (like Adil Hussein) in Egypt raises questions about what it
means to act “politically”, how agency is related to acting “politically”, and how particular practices may or may not be “political”. Mahmood reveals this tension in the mosque movement in
Cairo: “Islamist political figures and publications often criticize mosque participants for promoting a form of religiosity that is devoid of any sociopolitical consequences, especially for the task
of restructuring the state” (Mahmood 52). These Islamists want religious rituals to help create a
certain polity rather than keep Muslim worship separate from other social institutions. Mosque
participants are critical of this approach because it tends to treat their religious practices as cultural customs rather than as the mode by which one may realize a pious life.
Considering what I laid out above, the tendency for the religious practices of the mosque
movement to be treated as inconsequential in terms of sociopolitical changes seems to stem from
the liberal conception of ethics and politics. Recall the discussion of Aristotelian versus Kantian
ethics from above.

Kantian ethics is so focused on norms, values, and principles that it fails to

take into consideration the specific form of moral actions (Mahmood 119). Under this discourse,
the religious practices of the mosque movement are discussed in terms of doctrinal and legal arguments rather than the various pedagogical aspects accessed (Mahmood 119). Mahmood calls
the discourse to push more toward the “positive ethics” I lay out above. Recall that this approach
doesn’t focus on whether one follows a moral code or not but rather the relationships the actor
invests into the practice, or how one interacts with a particular norm and the various elements
that make the person up (body, reason, emotion, volition, etc.) (Mahmood 120). This approach
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provides a unique ability to see specific work that people perform in their effort to realize a certain personhood or mode of being (agency).
Mahmood’s main contribution here, which I find particularly interesting and useful, is the
connection she draws between analyzing performative bodily practices in this way in order to
better understand politics and the relationship between social authority and individual freedom.
This connection is also present in James’ book and I draw the parallels by using Mahmood’s
suggestion of “positive ethics” where there is a less obvious distinction between the individual
and the social. Before I do this, I want to show how Mahmood makes this connection between
politics and bodily practices. She points out that for every different or varied approach to each
performative behavior there may be equally varied conceptions of individual/collective freedom
and the organization of political life (personal and public) that go along with these but the important aspect remains to be how one makes this connection (Mahmood 122). The important part
switches from understanding the individual separate from the social to understanding how these
two are related and interact in performative actions.
Mahmood claims that the debates regarding what is and is not required of Muslims demonstrate what is at stake in these practices. Each view can be thought of as representing more than
simply whether or not a particular practice needs to be performed. Rather, each view also carries
implicit connections to freedom and social authority, hence the connection to what it means to
act politically. While most liberals may claim that these various religious beliefs stem from or
are a result of the society in which the participants live, Mahmood claims that this approach relies on keeping the categories of the individual and the social separate. However, as performative
action and its relation to subjectivation shows, the relationship between the individual and the
social is not as simple as the liberal approach treats it.
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The various ritual practices encouraged in the mosque movement are meant to aid in the realization of a pious self in the mosque participant. When performing a certain practice there are
various emotions and dispositions the participant can and should invoke to aid in the effectiveness of the ritual in realizing this pious self. The mosque participants do not distinguish between
formal or conventional behavior, and routine informal or mundane activity (Mahmood 127).
Typically, in many academic circles, ritual is treated as a “special” form of human action not as
one of many mundane or pragmatic activities. The main point here is that separating ritual from
pragmatic actions (and the individual and social) is to strip it of its purpose for mosque participants: to form pious dispositions (Mahmood 128).
In regard to invoking emotion in ritual, the main goal the participants keep in mind regarding
this is to make “prescribed behavior (such as certain religious practices) natural to one’s disposition, and one’s virtuosity lay in being able to spontaneously enact its most conventional aspects
in a ritual context as much as in ordinary life, thereby making an a priori separation between individual feelings and socially prescribed behavior unfeasible” (Mahmood 131). In this sense, the
“ritual” begins to appear as effortless and natural as any other practice in one’s life, thereby
complicating the typical divide anthropologists place between ritual action and conventional action. I will demonstrate the same “effortlessness” in the cricket players that James discusses.
Let me now consider the connections between the performative acts of the women in the
mosque movement to what it means to the mosque participants to act “politically”. My main
points here stem from the reasoning behind avoiding the separation of the individual and the social. I do not mean to say that to act socially is to act politically but that one may act “politically” in the same way they may be considered to act “socially”. In the following paragraphs I discuss why the discussion of “politics” is relevant here: mainly because for nationalists in Egypt,
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acting politically is what is most important. However, as I reveal, sometimes the actions that
have the greatest “political” thrust or influence, are those that don’t seem to be explicitly “political”. For the women of the mosque movement, they seem satisfied “politically” to be able to
perform their ritual practices in the way that they do in order to transform themselves and perhaps in a combined effort, their society away from the modern push they receive on a daily basis.
Similarly, the cricket players in James’ book may not have been acting “politically” in the sense
that nationalists would think valuable, but as James’ own story comes to fruition it is evident that
cricket is indeed transformative in the same sense that an explicitly “political” action may be.
The Egyptian nationalist view, as expressed by Mona Hilmi, argues that the aim of ritual
should be to form or develop a self-aware and critical citizen. This differs and contrasts the aim
of ritual for the women of the mosque movement who aim ritual toward developing a faithful
and pious personhood. Since the aim of these two views is different, so is their reliance on ritual.
Hilmi’s conception of ritual gives it only contingent importance in achieving this goal of awakened citizenry. Also, she encourages the participant to be able to decipher between an inner
meaning and outward performances to express that inner meaning (Mahmood 133). Mosque
movement participants, on the other hand, view ritual as the only way one can come to achieve
their goal of practicing a pious disposition. Mahmood writes: “As such, outward bodily gestures
and acts (such as salat or wearing the veil) are indispensable aspects of the pious self in two
senses: first in the sense that the self can acquire its particular form only through the performance
of the precise bodily enactments; and second in the sense that the prescribed bodily forms are
necessary attributes of the self” (Mahmood 133). The point here is the differing views on interiority and exteriority.
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It seems that the conception of the relationship between a subject’s “exterior” and “interior”
is related to one’s views on what it means to act “politically”. For example, the mosque movement’s conception of the relationship between interiority and exteriority parallels the protestant
view that these bodily performances can serve as markers of one’s sincerity in their beliefs and
that the performances help transform one’s soul toward the desired being (Mahmood 135). Note
that the transformative power stems from interior of the person which is only made “real” by the
exterior. This view stems from Aristotelian ethics and its conception of habitus, which I will expand on in a moment. Note however, that this contrasts the nationalist view (and liberal view)
that places the emphasis on the exterior: how one acts in relation to a norm, its explicitly political
affect, and its result rather than accounting for the interior aspects which are seemingly just as
meaningful. I’ll now spend some time expanding on this notion of habitus that informs the conception of action and practice that Mahmood recognizes in the mosque participants.
Habitus in this Aristotelian sense refers to the conception that the external or performative
acts (in this case veiling or prayer) create and are in direct correlation to one’s inner dispositions.
In other words, habitus refers to a specific process by which a moral character is developed and
secured (Mahmood 135). Habitus is beneficial in constructing a more useful conception of
agency because it helps blur the line between interiority and exteriority. The blurring of these
categories requires observers and academics to consider the “interior” aspect of one’s actions
rather than the exterior and its social justifications. This latter approach is a closer representative
of Pierre Bourdieu’s approach to habitus which seems to be less useful than the Aristotelian conception of habitus.13

13

For understanding Bourdieu’s approach see: Bourdieu, Pierre (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Trans. R.
Nice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Aristotle’s approach to habitus focuses on acquiring a particular moral personhood or ethical
being through focused practice and with a certain degree of intentionality. One learns and comes
to embody the desired personhood or ethical statehood through careful and consistent practice in
which one coordinates their inner and outer dispositions toward this particular goal (Mahmood
136). In this view, one does not acquire moral statehood by simply performing an ethical action.
Rather, one comes to this moral statehood through consistent practice of ethical actions performed with the appropriate disposition. Mahmood writes: “What is noteworthy is that habitus
in this tradition of moral cultivation implies a quality that is acquired through human industry,
assiduous practice, and discipline, such that it becomes a permanent feature of a person’s character” (Mahmood 136). This view of habitus is shared among Islamist thinkers.
The problems with Bourdieu’s conception of habitus are similar to the problems with the secular liberal approach to agency: too much credit is given to the larger social institutions in
which one lives and acts, rather than the way in which someone’s particular life events form
agency. Bourdieu examines habitus as the way in which social conditions come to play out in
one’s actions. This approach gives less credit or consideration to one’s own active creation of
their habitus through “interior” functionalities. Bourdieu’s approach is less concerned with the
way in which one learns habitus and more with the “unconscious power of habitus through
which objective social conditions become naturalized and reproduced” (Mahmood 138). The
Aristotelian approach on the other hand, parallels more directly with what is encouraged of the
mosque participants in their daily practices such as veiling. This notion of habitus helps one understand why the mosque participants for one aren’t concerned with acting as “awakened citizens” like nationalists encourage, and second how they view their careful actions as being transformative in a way that should not be viewed as any less significant than explicitly “political”
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actions which seem to only consider the exterior of a person’s action rather than the seemingly
more meaningful “interior”.
I hope that the parallels of these views on habitus to sport are somewhat obvious but I will
now spend some time elucidating those parallels and why the Aristotelian version is also more
useful wen thinking about the cricket players in James’ book. I also use James’ work to help understand the way in which this more nuanced conception of agency can be understood or is useful.
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3.3

How James helps conceive of agency

First, I want to use James’ discussion of certain cricket players to demonstrate this intrinsic
link between interiority and exteriority when discussing the influential aspects of one’s character.
Recall that my main point here is to challenge the typically rigid boundaries set between these
categories of personhood. The methodological implications and hypotheticals run deep and are
complex but I merely want to demonstrate that the exterior aspect of a subject should not and
cannot be considered in itself and by itself. The interior aspect or everything that one brings to
the table with a particular performative action is equally important when considering the subject
that is formed and part of that action.
In most common descriptions of athletes, the athlete’s physical prowess and personality are
typically considered and treated as separate entities. If an athlete is known to be a stand up citizen it is considered a plus, but this is not typically treated as a requirement for the former aspect
(physical talent) of the athlete. This is representative of the liberal tendency to keep interiority
and exteriority as distinct categories.14
James’ description of these players, like Mahmood’s description of the women in the mosque
movement, challenges the line drawn between the two categories and demonstrates link between
interiority and exteriority in human beings. To James, those who had physical prowess but were
abominable characters, were not significant players. He recalls a young man named Matthew
from his early childhood who seemed to have potential to be a great player but his career was cut
short as it seems due to his sub-par attitude and demeanor: “Matthew’s career did not last long.
He would not practice regularly, he would not pay his subscription to the club…I remember
Raze, the Indian, watching him practice one day and shaking his head with deep regret: how
14

Recall the critique made by Mahmood that interiority and exteriority of a practitioner cannot be treated as distinct
categories. She discusses this on page 134 of her text and I discuss it beginning on page 51 of this paper.
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could a man who could bat like that so waste his talent” (James 4). Later, I will discuss how this
relates to the concept of habitus and how it is evident that Matthew did not have the “interior”
make up required to form habitus in a technical practice. James, early on, sees that to be a great
cricket player one must step up to the task both mentally and physically. This resonates with the
feelings of the participants of the mosque movement toward people who practice veiling or
prayer without the mental or interior make up required to make such practices meaningful or effective.
To understand why these excerpts describing the unique cricket players James interacted
with, one must keep in mind the careful practice required to form habitus. Recognizing this, the
detail behind James’ descriptions becomes invaluable and almost difficult to comprehend its
complexity. Next, one must link this habitus to the interiority of the person: to practice true habitus requires so much of a person it must stem from the interior as well as the exterior. James
sets these players apart from “you and me” because it is assumed that most people do not take
such careful practice in their lives, this is what separates the great player from the recreational
player. In terms of the mosque movement, it is what separates those who are genuinely working
toward a pious disposition and life from those who practice rituals without such careful and
mindful practice.
I will use James’ description of George Headley and Constantine to demonstrate the importance of the “mental” part of the game. Let this “mental” aspect be representative of one aspect
of the “interior” of the player. George Headley, according to James, is one of the greatest batsmen he has ever seen. George also serves as a good example because while James views him as
a “natural” cricketer (opposed to a crafted/learned one), I still see evidence of great concentration
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and effort by George to be this great cricketer. Even those who seem to have “natural” talent
require concentration and practice to become great.
James describes George as having three great abilities in the cricket game: he saw the ball
early, was quick on his feet, and was quick with his feet. James writes: “Any single one of these
three qualities makes a fine batsman, and courage and confidence are the natural result of having
all three” (James 140). James describes the one time that George found himself in an unfavorable position while batting and George’s response is that he vowed to never let himself be found
in that position again. This assertion by George is telling because it demonstrates that he is able
to control a situation like this by deciding to not let himself be found in that situation. He controls the physical aspect of his game with interior mechanics. James asserts that one quality of
any great practitioner is that any registered experience, like this one for James, becomes a permanent part of them (James 144). This example reinforces the reason that the liberal resistance/acceptance binary fails.
This is not meant to portray that once George simply decided to not be caught in such a poor
position again, it happened. Rather, it represents the dedication he had toward making this reality: putting every aspect of his body and disposition toward achieving this. James notes the way
in which George was able to concentrate on any given task: “And I have met very few men who
can concentrate on anything as George concentrated on batting...these qualities were not remote
from those which made George the batsman he was” (James 147). This seems to parallel exactly
what the women of the mosque movement aim for in their practices. A form of concentration
that consumes their whole being: interior and exterior.
Now I want to use James’ description of Constantine to highlight aspects of Mahmood’s
work that are present in James’ work. Constantine is considered by James to be one of the great-
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est cricket players during that time. James’ description of Constantine spends a great deal of
time expanding on not only Constantine’s skills on the cricket field but also his personality.
What does this imply? James recognizes that there is something significant about a cricket
player and his personality characteristics. His story would not be complete without consideration
of Constantine’s character. This is an example of blurring the categories of interiority and exteriority that Mahmood is a proponent of. I use examples of James’ discussion of the player both
on the field and off the field to show that his approach to describing a person also blurs the categories of interiority and exteriority. It is not necessarily the case that play on the field is representative of interiority or exteriority but rather that the player on the field is not a complete picture.
I will now highlight what specifically, James mentions in terms of Constantine’s personality.
I use this term “personality” vaguely in the sense that it is tricky to use most words in a context
that is meant to question standard conceptions of language and its use in academic discourse.
With that consideration, James points out that Constantine, despite being a West Indian black
man of lower middle class during the colonial time, he “felt himself as good as anyone else”
(James 104). Even more significant is the reason behind this characteristic: that because of his
father’s prominence he was taught and raised by some of the best cricketers on the island who
would not let him see or believe otherwise. This demonstrates that it is not just social class or
institutions that influence or form one’s being, but rather, more specific and complex players are
at work in creating a person, their actions, and emotional approach to actions.
James recognizes a key contrast in Constantine’s life that shaped his character: the contrast
between “his first-class status as a cricketer and his third-class status as a man” (James 106).
Constantine became a great cricket player and James attributes this, in part, to the spark that was
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lit by his experience off the cricket field. The main point is that Constantine felt a stranger in his
own country which drove him to eventually settle abroad. He couldn’t even be secured a job in
the West Indies while away playing for the country.
In this example we see how social institutions come to play a part in larger actions. Could
Constantine’s settling abroad be representative of a resistance to the social circumstances? Sure,
but it seems more simply that he needed to leave in order to survive and make a life. Even more
ironic is his absorption with cricket, also a sport of the colonizers causing such circumstances.
He did not come to reject the sport but rather needed it to provide life outside of the West Indies.
More telling for our purposes here is that through the performative aspects of cricket he was able
to form not only a great cricket player, but one that is politically minded and passionate about his
experience in the West Indies.
Eventually, James went to visit Constantine in England in order to gather material for a
cricket book. James reflects on these interactions: “We didn’t know it but we were making history. This transcendence of our relations as cricketers was to initiate the West Indian renaissance
not only in cricket, but in politics, in history and in writing” (James 110-111). This excerpt on
his approach to the interactions with Constantine is significant because it demonstrates that without realizing it, the two of them were acting “politically” by simply recording their experiences
with a sport they both felt passionately about. This point is relevant because similarly, the women of the mosque movement believe themselves to be acting politically even though they are not
acting in the way that the nationalists think they should be acting.
Cricket is a useful “non-religious” example that proves to be as complex as any art or trade
or craft that requires habitus. As discussed above in regard to Mahmood’s project, habitus is relevant in this project because it points to what is required of a subject to form habitus. The form-
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ing of habitus in a certain practice is relevant because it points to how deep these practices run
for many practitioners of the ritual or in James’ book, sport. It is this depth of the practices that
gives the practices transformative power in the subject which make its ties to agency clearer.
James’ book exposes this complexity and what is required of a great player. This is useful for
providing a “non-religious” example for which to apply this greater conception of agency.
James exposes the complexity of cricket by discussing the minutia of the game in detail and
what goes into them at several different points of the book. He frequently notes how rare it is to
find someone who really understands what is going on in the game and appreciate the art of it.
He describes talking cricket with such a person as a profound experience it is to meet such a person. The following excerpt demonstrates the multi-layered aspect of cricket that James understood and appreciated:
I never had enough of talking to St. Hill about his late-cut. In so far as it was explicable, his secret was that he
never timed that ball from the pitch, as I have seen great batsmen do and get out. He did not lie back and lash
across, as George Cox used to do. He didn’t hammer the bat into the ground as Frank Worrell does (one of the
great strokes of our time). He took up position early, watched the ball well on its way and then launched his
wrists into the stroke...So far he was all grace, all elegance, always there long in advance. But there was primitive hidden in him. If a fast bowler blocked his leg-glance-it was no use putting short-legs for he kept the ball
down, always- or sometimes for no visible reason, all this suavity disappeared. He stretched his left foot down
the wicket and, with a sweep that seemed to begin from first-slip and encompassed the whole horizon, smashed
the ball hard and low to square-leg. Sweep is not the correct word. It was a swing, begun when the ball was
almost within reach, and carried out with a violence that seemed aimed at the ball personally, to hit it out of
sight or break it into bits. (James 84-85)

This excerpt is useful for two reasons. First, it points to the minutia of cricket that makes it an
appropriate topic for relating to something like ritual. It is a useful example because most “outsiders” to a particular sport do not understand the basic functioning of the sport let alone appreciate, as James does, the detail of what is required by players to make such a play. The same
goes for ritual as described by Mahmood about the mosque participants. An “outsider”, of
course, cannot really appreciate or understand the genuine religious beliefs behind certain rituals
but Mahmood’s work provides enough description to show that it is not a mere scripted act but
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one that requires practice and particularity in performing it. The same is shown here by James. I
know very little about cricket but recognize how technical of a sport it is and this connects to the
amount of practice required of its practitioners to be able to make such plays.
Second, of all the different aspects of cricket I mention that James gives in this book; excerpts like this are the fundamental level of what makes up the game that has such a large impact
on its participants and the culture surrounding it. To an outsider it may merely look like the
swinging of a bat. But to James, he sees this description. Similarly, an outsider may simply see
a woman wearing a veil but for her, she is performing a technical practice that requires a lot of
her to do it correctly.
Finally, I want to consider how James’ book relates to the relevant discussion of norms
and how people relate to them. In the previous section I discuss the tension James experienced
as a school boy in the classroom with his attitude and approach to cricket. He and the rest of the
boys at school with him struggled together to find a unified code in cricket. They were simultaneously participating in and creating their own code. In what way are they creating their own
code? James’ personal interaction with it is just one relation to it. For every participant there is
probably a different story or relation to it. This is exactly the point though: cricket playing provides the outlet for practicing this norm or code that one makes his own in the particular way he
connects and interacts with it through habitus. Simultaneously, his subject is being formed
which is what he brings to ethical and political instances.
For James, as I mention in his interaction with Constantine, became politically minded
without even realizing it. He concedes that cricket is the main player in creating his political
identity. He references others who agree; “In an article welcoming the West Indies team of 1957
E.W. Swanton has written in the Daily Telegraph that in the West Indies the cricket ethic has
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shaped not only cricketers but social life as a whole. It is an understatement. There is a whole
generation of us, and perhaps two generations, who have been formed by it not only in social attitudes but in our most intimate personal lives, in fact there more than anywhere else” (James
41). This shows how deep cricket ran in the society that James grew up in. It references the
connection between those practices that people participate in and how they can come to form and
influence society. It is not that the mosque movement Mahmood studied is some sort of revolutionary approach aiming to make people’s everyday practices seem like political ones so that nationalists and liberals can see it as more palatable. Rather, it is necessarily the case that those
practices humans participate in have deeper connections to society and its norms. The field and
particular practices are the practitioners’ entry into how to make the interaction their own. In
turn, the practice remains dynamic as new subjects come to interact and form and re-form the
sport or practice.
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CONCLUSION

This project aims to expose that the liberal conception of agency and the rigid categories and
assumptions that accompany it lead to approaching agency in terms of whether or not someone
has or practices agency in the form of resistance to norms, rather than focusing on how agency is
practiced. The concept of agency in academia needs to be reconceived because most of the liberal assumptions about agency (such as that every human has an autonomous will) is where most
liberal prescriptions for ethical and political prescriptions stem from.
To understand that not all acts of agency necessarily stem from an autonomous will, one may
consider common human social practices such as religious rituals or sport. It seems that participation in either or both of those should be accounted for in terms of agency as most humans or
cultures seem to participate in some form of either.
The typical liberal conception of agency however, usually locates true agency in acts of resistance to social norms and practices rather than participation in them. Mahmood’s book helps
to point out how this liberal approach is especially problematic when trying to conceive of the
women participants in the mosque movement in Egypt. She provides insight into how much effort and work these women put into religious practices such as veiling and prayer. This “effort”
is not simply physical, but all-encompassing in the sense that it requires all aspects of their being
in order for it to aid in achieving the aim of a pious disposition.
It is helpful here to think of habitus and the way that one becomes practiced at gearing their
entire being toward a particular aim or goal. As James explains in his book, this approach is also
relevant for cricket. The great cricket players that James gets to know and describes in the book
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not only have spectacular skill when it comes to cricket playing, but also have a noteworthy demeanor off the field. This observation is useful for calling into question the liberal tendency to
treat the categories of interiority and exteriority (how one’s internal volitions, beliefs, emotions,
etc. relate to surface or bodily actions) as separate entities. Both Mahmood and James show that
these two categories need to be considered in combination with one another because they are not
necessarily separate and any tendency to portray them as separate is misguided.
I use James to help elucidate the points in Mahmood’s project that I find helpful for conceiving of agency not only in religious or feminist discourse, but in regard to other forms of human
actions such as sport. The actions of the players in James’ book in typical liberal discourse are
considered outside the realm of ritual, but understanding ritual the way the mosque participants
do helps to see how these actions may be and should be characterized (or at least examined) as
rituals. In the other direction, using examples from James shows that rituals are not strictly religious in form but have the political thrust that Mahmood points to.
The analysis of ritual in order to understand the agency at work must consider the emotions
and dispositions at work when a person performs a particular act. This forces the academic to
consider not only the act itself, but also what emotions one experiences/invokes while practicing
these rituals. The players that James describes show the relationship between them as a cricket
player and them off the field as inseparable categories. It is not necessarily the case that there is
a set relationship between the way one acts off the field or approaches a play with certain dispositions to how they actually play, but the main point is that without considering both, part of the
picture or story is missed.
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This greater conception of agency aims to blur categories of what constitutes ritual and ritual’s relation to agency and in turn, expose many of its accompanying implications such as what
it means to act ethically and politically.
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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Sport in Academia: What’s Missing?
Here I provide an excerpt from an unfinished project where I aim to use Mahmood’s Politics of Piety and James’ Beyond a Boundary to make specific arguments about the discourse of
sport in academia. This excerpt specifically outlines the critique I want to make about the discussion of sport in academia rather than its correlation to what I say about agency. I hope that
the critique provided here may at least parallel some of the critiques I make about the discourse
on agency.
Theories regarding the study of sport in academia have taken many different forms.
Some of these forms are more useful and interesting than others. Generally, they all seek to answer the question “what does sport really do for society or how does it really play out in society?” In this section I will mention a few of the different theories of sociologists and historians
(which often overlap and are by no means comprehensive), explain how each has different
strengths and weaknesses, and how my study relates to each.
There are three theories that I want to focus on. First, I focus on the theory that asserts
sport is a tool used by society for socializing its subjects. According to this theory, sport helps to
instill particular character traits in its participants that are useful in ordering society. One may
hear parents discuss enrolling their child in particular sports to teach them discipline, or commitment and responsibility. Some people encourage participation in sports to boost one’s confidence which is a key ingredient to be a successful member in a capitalistic society. This is representative of a theory of sport serving a particular social function.15

15

James Frey refers to this theory as the “structural-functionalist” theory of sport. He writes: “these and subsequent
works focused on socialization of youth through sport, sport as a vehicle for assimilation, sport as a social system,
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Several psychologists and sociologists have dedicated their studies to analyzing how
children utilize play/games/sport to help assimilate with society.16 Generally, they debate the
motivations behind children partaking in certain activities and actions. These motivations range
from anything like the desire to fulfill one’s gender roles to acting for rewards that come with
obeying of rules (which are in place to socialize agents).
Norman Denzin articulates a critique of these approaches similar to the critique that I
want to make of sport theories in general. Denzin claims that these studies often decontextualize
the actual play or game they are analyzing: “In their de-contextualization of games and play,
contemporary theorists have failed to grasp the fundamental fact that all instances of play and
games involve the interactions (which may not be face-to-face) of one or more persons who are
orienting their cognitive, physical, and symbolic behaviors toward themselves, one another, or
animate and inanimate objects” (Denzin 462). While my study is not concerned with the specifics of this critiques, I do argue that decontextualization is a primary fault of these theories. Focusing too much on what may constitute external motivations for play or games, often results in
overlooking the sport itself. I do not argue that there are no external motivations in sport, but
that to limit sport to this results in deep decontextualization and overgeneralization.
This theory is beneficial for understanding some of the secondary features of sport or the
usefulness sport may have in maintaining a cohesive society. In other words, by practicing a
sport, one does not merely get better at that sport, but perhaps also gets better at being a functional member of society and fosters those valued characteristics of society (as this theory points

the relationship of sport to other institutions, and the integrating functions of sport for participants, observers, and
social organizations” (504).
16
For the purposes of remaining on topic I do not spend time delineating between the differences between
play/games/sport. For discussion on this and references to more studies see Denzin, Norman K, “Play, Games, and
Interaction: the Contexts of Childhood Socialization” in The Sociological Quarterly vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 458-478.
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out to us).17 This theory recognizes the way in which sport may assimilate particular subjects
who would otherwise be/feel marginalized (note that this approach seems fundamental to the argument made by those who argue that it is a repressive capitalistic institution…because it socializes). This may be why one often hears of parents of “troubled” children being encouraged to
get their children involved with sports. Sport is “the way in” to a particular society for some
people because of the way that it provides grounds for working together with other members of
society or conflict solving with a teammate, etc.
However, this very strength points to a fault of this theory: it may overplay the role of
sport in society and mask the potentially repressive forms that sport takes. Some may argue that
if a particular society is repressive in nature, then it should change. If a particular social institution (i.e. sport) helps to recreate the repressive nature of society, perhaps it should be avoided
and a theory regarding sport should account for this. In addition, this theory of sport fails to account for other essential aspects of sport. While it may be the case that in particular circumstances sport may result in the socialization of some individuals, this is not necessarily what sport
is really about. It is this fault I see prevalent in all three theories of sport that I want to address in
my project.
The second theory I find unsatisfactory asserts that sport reinforces particular inequalities
of society. Some refer to this as “conflict theory”, accounting for the fact that sport may actually
reinforce conflict in society rather than make it more functional and peaceful as suggested by the
previous theory. This theory seems to stem from a Marxian or anti-capitalistic framework: sport

17

Note that I agree with this to a certain extent: that there are secondary features to practicing sport and furthermore
that those features often play out in society. However, I disagree that the practice of sport serves the function of socialization. By looking at the mundane features of sport that I suggest, one may see that sport can actually serve to
create a socially critical being (this is not my argument but my project is at least open to accounting for such a story).
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is scrutinized for contributing to the creation of mindless subjects who are tricked into being
seemingly “happy” in their role in society.18
The main strength of this theory is that it keeps the first theory in check, so to speak. It
alerts us to the potential problems with sport if the first theory is accurate. In other words, this
theory shows the downfall to sport when it acts as an institution of socialization. The weakness
is that it leaves little room for seeing the beneficial quality of sport. Surely, the answer to the
question “what does sport really do in society?” should be well rounded and include, if there are
any, the beneficial parts of sport. Both of these approaches focus on sport as a generalized practice. In other words, both of the approaches look at general practices that seem to be relevant to
most social institutions like organized meetings and practice with official matches or games.
The arguments made by either of these approaches can be made about most social institutions
(i.e. education). The weakness of this is that it fails to account for what makes sport unique and
therefore meaningful for most of its participants (i.e. the way that it uses the human body) and
the societies in which it takes place.
This leads to the next approach to sport I want to discuss: sport as a corporation heavily
influenced by the media’s portrayal. Some theorists argue that sport, especially contemporary
sport, is merely another commodified good that is perpetuated and motivated by money and media. This approach parallels the criticism I want to discuss further: that nutrition has only become a significant aspect of sport in the last few decades and is merely an attempt to make money. These theorists use the development of science and technology to point to this phenomenon.

18

Allen Guttman gives several examples of work in this field. He mentions John Hargreaves and Richard
Gruneau as examples of authors who have emphasized class relationships and inequalities in British and North
American sport. Their work was critiqued by other scholars for being apologetic to capitalism and reacted by asserting that sports are the “mirror image of-rather than the emancipatory alternative to- the repressive, exploitive,
achievement-oriented world of work” (Guttman 374).
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These theorists attempt to show that the Olympics, college athletics, and professional sports are
all driven by factors outside the motivation to play.19 The motivation to play is driven primarily
by money and media.
One advantage to studying sport in this way is that it examines a possible way that technology and money have affected sport. Also, it points to the way in which the public may interact with sport if people themselves are not participants (which is, in part, an answer to the question at hand). However, the downfall to this theory is that, once again, it fails to look at what
these changes provide for sport itself and, moreover, what motivates these changes. It seems that
by viewing any technological advances in sport purely as a sign of commodification of sport fails
to recognize the use of such technology: why does that athlete purchase it, and does it serve a
practical use beyond this? It is important to look at the changes these things have brought from
within the sport not merely how “outsiders” or viewer perspective has changed. I think that all
three of these dominant theories regarding sport, although useful, still fail to account for particular aspects of sport that seem to be essential to its practice. I will show this by borrowing Saba
Mahmood’s approach to ritual and applying it to sport with James as an example of a work that
begins such an approach.

19

Frey/Eitzen write: “This type of sport is hardly voluntary; rules are formal, generalizable, and enforced by formal
regulatory bodies; the outcome is serious for individuals and organizations not actually participating…and winning
(the outcome) is more important than participation (the process). (509).

